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Paper Feed: An Essay on the Principle of Population

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This episode covers An Essay on the Principle of Population, an essay by Malthus whose preface is dated 7 June 1798. Its full title adds that the essay considers how the principle affects the future improvement of society, with remarks on the speculations of Godwin, Condorcet and other writers.

The essay takes up a question that divided its age: whether human society can improve without limit, or whether people are condemned to swing between happiness and misery. Its central claim is that population, when unchecked, grows in a geometrical ratio while the food the earth produces grows only in an arithmetical one, so the two must be kept level by misery or by vice. The author applies this to the speculations of William Godwin and Condorcet, and then to the English poor laws, to colonial settlement, to the early history of hunting and herding peoples, and to the purpose of hardship in forming the human mind.

This is an argument in prose rather than an experiment. It draws on figures for the American colonies, on tables of births, burials and marriages from German and English registers, on population estimates for Britain and China, and on a worked calculation for an island and then for the whole earth. The method is largely comparative: general propositions are checked against cases drawn from many societies, and the author carries his numbers forward to show where the arithmetic leads. Most of the figures are borrowed from other writers rather than gathered by the author, and the text says nothing about funding.

The essay is strongest where it grants its opponents' premises and then tests their conclusions against numbers, and where it states its assumptions openly, often choosing rates generous to the other side. It is weaker where its evidence is thin. The author admits the work would have been more complete with a greater number of facts, and he says a long stretch of professional work left him little time to gather them. Several of his claims about the positive check, the mortality of poor children and the causes of sickly seasons rest on a few registers and short periods, and he warns that ratios drawn from five or ten years can mislead. Much of the case against perfectibility rests on reasoning from general laws of nature, which the evidence supports but does not fully prove.

The text states no venue. Its preface is dated 7 June 1798, and the front matter gives the full title. According to the corpus, OpenAlex has no record of the document: as of 18 October 2026, no work in its index matches this title and these authors. This episode therefore makes no claim about how often the essay has been cited.

The author begins by explaining where the essay came from. It grew out of a conversation with a friend about the future improvement of society, prompted by the writer William Godwin's essay on "Avarice and Profusion". The author first meant only to set his thoughts down more clearly than conversation allowed, but as the subject opened up, ideas came to him that he did not recall meeting elsewhere, and he decided to publish them.

He is candid that the work could have been stronger. The essay "might, undoubtedly, have been rendered much more complete by a collection of a greater number of facts in elucidation of the general argument." A long stretch of demanding professional work, and a wish not to delay publication much past his original plan, left him little time to gather more. He still believes the facts he does give make considerable evidence for his view of the future of mankind.

The central claim starts from a truth many writers had noted: "population must always be kept down to the level of the means of subsistence." The author's point is that no writer he knew of had examined closely the means by which that level is reached. In his view, it is "the strongest obstacle in the way to any very great future improvement of society." He argues that little more is needed to establish this than "a plain statement, in addition to the most cursory view of society."

On his own conduct, the author says he is "actuated solely by a love of truth, and not by any prejudices against any particular set of men, or of opinions." He admits he read earlier speculations about improvement without wishing to find them empty, but says he cannot believe what he would like without evidence, nor refuse assent to an unwelcome conclusion that the evidence supports.

He anticipates the charge of gloom. "The view which he has given of human life has a melancholy hue," he concedes, but he says the dark tints come "from a conviction that they are really in the picture, and not from a jaundiced eye or an inherent spleen of disposition." He says the theory of mind developed in the last two chapters explains most of the evils of life to his own satisfaction, and leaves it to readers to judge whether it persuades them.

He closes by saying that if abler men show that this main difficulty can be removed, even in theory, "he will gladly retract his present opinions and rejoice in a conviction of his error." The note is dated 7 June 1798.

The opening pages set the stage with the sweeping changes of the author's time: unexpected discoveries in natural philosophy, the spread of knowledge through printing, a restless spirit of inquiry, and above all the French Revolution, which the author describes as "like a blazing comet" that "seems destined either to inspire with fresh life and vigour, or to scorch up and destroy the shrinking inhabitants of the earth." Many able men, the author notes, came to believe that they stood at a turning point that would help decide the future of mankind.

The central question, as the author puts it, is "whether man shall henceforth start forwards with accelerated velocity towards illimitable, and hitherto unconceived improvement, or be condemned to a perpetual oscillation between happiness and misery." In other words, can human society keep improving without limit, which is the idea of perfectibility, or are people doomed to swing back and forth between good times and hardship?

The author laments that the two sides rarely engage each other honestly. Defenders of the existing order tend to dismiss reformers either as schemers hiding ambition behind kind words or as wild enthusiasts. Reformers answer with equal scorn, portraying defenders as slaves to narrow prejudice or as people who profit from abuses and cannot see past their own noses. The author says that in this quarrel the cause of truth suffers. He also observes that in practice so much friction and so many small circumstances arise that no theory can be called sound until the objections against it have been weighed and answered.

The author then says that he has read speculations on human perfectibility with pleasure and wishes their happy outcomes were real. But he sees difficulties that he regards as insurmountable, and he states that he would be glad to see them removed rather than use them to triumph over reformers. The most important of these arguments, he says, is not new. Its principles were explained in part by Hume and more fully by Adam Smith, and it was applied to this subject by a Mr Wallace, though not with its full weight. The author is puzzled that thinkers of great ability and candour, such as Godwin and Condorcet, scarcely take notice of it and continue with unshaken confidence. He suggests that when able people ignore an argument, a reader should doubt his own reading of it, much as a man who repeatedly ignores an offered glass of wine might be blind or unmannerly rather than unwilling.

To keep the argument disciplined, the author sets aside mere conjectures, meaning suppositions that cannot be grounded in sound philosophical reasoning. He offers an example:

A writer may tell me that he thinks man will ultimately become an ostrich.

Before such a claim could persuade anyone, the author argues, its supporter would have to show that human necks, lips, legs and hair were already changing in the way that a transformation into a bird would require. Without evidence of that kind, the author says, it is wasted effort to describe the happiness of a future humanity that is freed from labour.

The author then makes two postulata, which are assumptions he asks readers to accept. The first is that "food is necessary to the existence of man." The second is that "the passion between the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly in its present state." He argues that both laws have been fixed for as long as people have been known, and that no change in them has been observed, so there is no reason to expect them to cease without a direct act of divine power.

On the second postulate, the author addresses Godwin's conjecture that the passion between the sexes might in time be extinguished. He points out that Godwin himself presented this as a conjecture. The author notes that human progress from the savage state is real, but that no progress at all has been made toward ending the sexual passion, which seems as strong now as it was thousands of years ago. Exceptions have always existed, but they do not seem to be growing in number, and it would be unphilosophical, the author says, to assume that an exception will become the rule.

With the postulata granted, the author states his main claim: "the power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man." He explains the difference in rates of growth.

Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio.

A geometrical ratio multiplies at each step, as with doubling, while an arithmetical ratio adds the same amount at each step. The author says that a slight acquaintance with numbers shows how much larger the first power is than the second.

From this comes a consequence.

By that law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal.

The author holds that this requires a strong and constant check on population from the difficulty of obtaining food, and that this difficulty must fall somewhere and be felt severely by a large part of humanity.

The author illustrates the point with nature. Nature has scattered the seeds of life with a lavish hand but has been sparing with the room and nourishment needed to raise them.

Necessity, that imperious all pervading law of nature, restrains them within the prescribed bounds.

Among plants and animals this shows up as wasted seed, sickness and early death. Among people it shows up as misery and vice. The author says that misery is an absolutely necessary consequence of the law. Vice is a highly probable consequence and is widely seen, but he says it "ought not, perhaps, to be called an absolutely necessary consequence," because resisting temptation is the test of virtue.

The author concludes that the imbalance between the power of population and the power of the earth to produce food, together with the law that keeps their effects equal, is the great obstacle to perfectibility. He argues that no scheme of shared property or agrarian regulation, however far it went, could relieve the pressure of this law even for a single century. It therefore rules out a society in which all members live in ease and comparative leisure without anxiety about providing for themselves and their families.

Consequently, if the premises are just, the argument is conclusive against the perfectibility of the mass of mankind.

The author says he will examine the argument more closely later, and he expects that experience, "the true source and foundation of all knowledge," will confirm it.

Malthus tests the claim he has just made, that population grows in a geometrical ratio while food grows in an arithmetical one. He begins with a thought experiment. No known state, he concedes, has ever been free of checks on early marriage. The poor fear they cannot provide for a family, and the wealthy fear losing their station. Imagine instead a society of equality, virtue and plenty, where nothing holds people back. In such a place, he argues, "the increase of the human species would evidently be much greater than any increase that has been hitherto known."

He then turns to a real case. In the United States, where food was more plentiful and manners were purer, "the population has been found to double itself in twenty-five years." He adopts that as his rule: unchecked population doubles every twenty-five years, which is what a geometrical ratio means. A geometrical ratio is growth by repeated multiplication, so each doubling is larger than the last.

Food is harder to measure, so he takes a generous assumption. Using the island he has in view, which is Britain, he allows that by the best possible policy, breaking up more land and encouraging agriculture, its produce might double in the first twenty-five years. He thinks a quadrupling in the next twenty-five years is impossible, because it would go against what we know of the qualities of land. Even so, he takes as his rule that each later quarter-century could add a quantity of food equal to what the island already produces. He calls that far beyond the truth, but it is a steady addition rather than a multiplication, and so he concludes:

It may be fairly said, therefore, that the means of subsistence increase in an arithmetical ratio.

He then sets the two rates side by side. The island is taken to hold about seven million people, fed by its present produce. In the first twenty-five years population reaches fourteen million, and food doubles to match. In the next period there are twenty-eight million people but food for only twenty-one million. After another period there are fifty-six million people and food for about half that. At the end of the first century there are one hundred and twelve million people and food for thirty-five million, "which would leave a population of seventy-seven millions totally unprovided for."

He widens the frame to the whole earth. Taking a population of a thousand million, the human species would rise through the series 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 and so on, while subsistence rises 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and so on. He gives the gap at specific points:

In two centuries and a quarter, the population would be to the means of subsistence as 512 to 10.

Within three centuries the ratio is 4096 to 13, and after two thousand years the difference is almost incalculable. He grants that the earth's productions have no fixed limit, but because the power of population is of a higher order, the two can only be kept in step by "the strong law of necessity acting as a check upon the greater power."

He explains how that check works, starting with plants and animals. They are driven by a powerful instinct to multiply, and nothing stops them to weigh their offspring's prospects. "Wherever therefore there is liberty, the power of increase is exerted," and the surplus is then cut back by lack of room and food, and among animals by predators. People are different. They have an equally powerful urge to reproduce, but reason steps in and asks whether they can provide for the children they would bring into the world. In a society of equals that question would be simple. In the society he describes, other concerns follow. Malthus lists them as questions a man would ask himself:

Will he not lower his rank in life?

Will he not have to labour harder, and can his efforts support a large family?

May he not see his offspring in rags and misery, and clamouring for bread that he cannot give them?

He argues that these worries do in fact deter a large share of people in every civilized nation from marrying young.

And this restraint almost necessarily, though not absolutely so, produces vice.

Even in the most vicious societies, though, the drive toward a virtuous attachment remains strong, so there is a constant pressure for population to grow. That pressure, he says, "tends to subject the lower classes of the society to distress and to prevent any great permanent amelioration of their condition."

His account of how this works is a cycle. Suppose a country's food is just enough for its people, say seven million. Population grows before food does, so the same food must now be shared among seven and a half or eight million. The poor live worse and many fall into severe distress. Because there are more workers than jobs, wages fall while food prices rise, so

the labourer therefore must work harder to earn the same as he did before.

Marriage becomes harder and families harder to raise, and population stalls. Meanwhile cheap labour and plentiful hands encourage farmers to take on more workers, break in new soil, and improve their fields, until food catches up with the population. Once the labourer is again reasonably comfortable, restraints on marriage loosen, and "the same retrograde and progressive movements with respect to happiness are repeated."

Malthus admits this swing is hard to see. "This sort of oscillation will not be remarked by superficial observers," and even a careful thinker would struggle to predict its timing. Still, he holds that some such vibration exists in every old society, though irregular and less clear than his description, and that no thoughtful person who studies the subject closely can doubt it.

Why, then, is it not more obvious? He gives several reasons. The main one is that the histories we have are "histories only of the higher classes," so the lives of the poor, where these swings happen, are poorly recorded. A reliable account would need a long and close study of one people over one period, tracking marriages against the adult population, the death rates of children in the poorest families compared with better-off ones, and changes in the real price of labour. The timing would also be scrambled by other forces: new or failing manufactures, shifts in farming enterprise, good and bad harvests, wars, pestilence, poor laws, labour-saving machines not matched by growing markets, and above all the gap between nominal and real wages. The nominal wage is the money paid, and the real wage is what that money buys.

On that gap he writes:

It very rarely happens that the nominal price of labour universally falls, but we well know that it frequently remains the same, while the nominal price of provisions has been gradually increasing.

That is "in effect, a real fall in the price of labour," and during it the lower orders grow steadily worse off, even though their pay has not visibly dropped. When work later becomes plentiful and wages rise, the rise is slow, because the labour market is not free. Parish laws and the easier organising of the rich, compared with the poor, hold wages down. Malthus writes that the rich then "affect to grant it as an act of compassion and favour to the poor," hiding the real cause of the rise.

He adds that no form of society could fully escape this pressure. Under inequality, misery acts on a large part of humankind, and "upon all, if all were equal."

The chapter then states three propositions the rest of the essay will rely on. First,

That population cannot increase without the means of subsistence is a proposition so evident that it needs no illustration.

Second,

That population does invariably increase where there are the means of subsistence, the history of every people that have ever existed will abundantly prove.

Third, that the greater power of population cannot be held back without producing misery or vice, a bitter pair that human history has shown repeatedly. He ends by saying that a quick survey of the different conditions in which people have lived should be enough to show these propositions to be "incontrovertible truths."

The chapter turns first to the rudest state of mankind, where hunting is the main way of getting food. Because food is scattered over a large territory, the population in such a society must be thin. The author notes that the passion between the sexes is said to be less ardent among the North American Indians than among any other race of men. Even so, the tendency to increase seems in that people to be always greater than the means to support it.

The evidence is that population grows quickly whenever a tribe settles on a fertile spot and draws food from sources other than hunting. The essay reports that when an Indian family settled near a European settlement and adopted an easier, more civilised way of life, one woman reared five, six or more children, while in the savage state rarely more than one or two in a family grew to maturity. The same was observed of the Hottentots near the Cape. From these facts the author concludes that they "prove the superior power of population to the means of subsistence in nations of hunters, and that this power always shews itself the moment it is left to act with freedom."

The question then becomes whether this power can be checked so that its effects stay equal to the means of subsistence, "without vice or misery." The author argues that the North American Indians cannot fairly be called free and equal. In the accounts of them, and of most savage nations, the women are shown as far more completely enslaved to the men than the poor are to the rich in civilised countries. Half the nation, in effect, acts as helots to the other half, and the misery that checks population falls chiefly on that lower half.

The author describes the burdens this places on women. Infants need considerable care, but women are condemned to frequent changes of place and to "the constant and unremitting drudgery of preparing every thing for the reception of their tyrannic lords." Work done during pregnancy or with children on their backs must often cause miscarriages and keep all but the most robust infants from growing up. Constant war and the need to expose aged and helpless parents add to the picture. The essay warns against judging a savage nation by its warriors alone:

In estimating the happiness of a savage nation, we must not fix our eyes only on the warrior in the prime of life.

The warrior is one of a hundred, the fortunate survivor of many failed efforts. The fairer comparison, the author suggests, is between the warriors and the gentlemen of civilised states, and between the women, children and aged and the lower classes of those states.

From this short review of nations of hunters, the author draws several inferences. Their population is thin because food is scarce. It would increase at once if food were more plentiful. And, putting vice aside, misery is the check that "represses the superior power of population and keeps its effects equal to the means of subsistence." Observation shows that "this check, with a few local and temporary exceptions, is constantly acting now upon all savage nations," and the theory suggests it acted with nearly equal strength a thousand years ago and may not be much greater a thousand years hence.

The author is less sure about nations of shepherds, the next stage of human society, and admits that we are "even more ignorant than of the savage state." Still, he holds that they could not escape the general lot of misery that comes with a shortage of subsistence. Want was the force that drove the Scythian shepherds from their homes, "like so many famished wolves in search of prey." Driven by that cause, bands of barbarians gathered from across the northern hemisphere, and their advance eventually "obscured the sun of Italy."

The essay explains why shepherds were so formidable. A country in pasture can support fewer people than one in tillage, but shepherds could move together, and they often had to move in search of fresh pasture. A tribe rich in cattle had plenty of food at once, and its men, confident of finding pasture by changing place, felt few fears about providing for a family. Population therefore grew, and the tribe had to move more often and over wider ground. When the whole group could no longer be supported together,

Young scions were then pushed out from the parent-stock and instructed to explore fresh regions and to gain happier seats for themselves by their swords.

Their spirit is captured in the words "The world was all before them where to choose."

These contests were brutal. Many tribes were exterminated, and others perished from hardship and famine. Yet the tribes that prospered sent out new adventurers in turn. The author writes that

The prodigious waste of human life occasioned by this perpetual struggle for room and food was more than supplied by the mighty power of population.

The tribes that moved south won fruitful lands through repeated battles and then grew rapidly in number and power, because their means of subsistence had increased. In time the whole territory from China to the Baltic was peopled by brave, robust and warlike barbarians.

The essay acknowledges that leaders such as Alaric, Attila and Zingis Khan fought for glory and for the fame of great conquests. But it insists that the true cause of the northern emigration, which kept pressing against China, Persia, Italy and even Egypt, was "a scarcity of food, a population extended beyond the means of supporting it." Absolute population at any moment could never be large, given the poor productivity of some regions, but people succeeded one another rapidly. As fast as some were cut down by war or famine, others rose to take their place.

Among these bold and improvident peoples, population was little restrained by any fear of future difficulties. Hope of better conditions through migration, the expectation of plunder, the option of selling children as slaves in distress, and the natural carelessness of the barbarian character all encouraged growth. That population was later reduced by famine or war. Where there was inequality, as there soon was among shepherds, the distress from scarce provisions fell hardest on the least fortunate, and women, exposed to plunder when their husbands were away and often disappointed in their return, felt it most.

The author concludes that, although the detailed history is unknown, nations of shepherds show a consistent pattern. Population increased whenever emigration or another cause raised the means of subsistence, and further growth was checked, keeping the actual population equal to the means of subsistence, by misery and vice. Vicious customs toward women were one such check, but the author adds that "the commission of war is vice, and the effect of it misery, and none can doubt the misery of want of food."

Malthus begins from what can be seen around us rather than from old accounts. He says that "population constantly bears a regular proportion to the food that the earth is made to produce", allowing for trade across borders and for shifts toward luxury or frugal habits. On that reasoning, the greater part of Europe is more populous now than in earlier times for one plain reason: "the industry of the inhabitants has made these countries produce a greater quantity of human subsistence."

He then explains why ancient numbers were overstated. Migrating peoples, moving all at once in search of new land, looked far more numerous than they were, and the fears of southern nations turned that appearance into a picture of northern lands "absolutely swarming with human beings." The author compares this to a traveller who meets droves of cattle coming from Wales and the north and wrongly concludes that those regions are the most productive in the kingdom.

Next he turns to China. If a country is the most fertile in the world, has almost all its land under the plough, grows two crops a year in much of it, and its people live very frugally, then one may infer that its population must be immense, without studying the habits of the poor. But he says a detailed history of the customs of the lower Chinese would matter a great deal, because it would show which checks hold numbers below what the land can feed: which vices and which distresses prevent a population from growing beyond the country's ability to support it.

Malthus then takes issue with David Hume's essay on the populousness of ancient and modern nations. Hume, the author says, does not see how little some of the causes he cites can reveal about actual population. The author's own rule is that the pattern of marriage shows the direction of change but not the size of a population. If early marriages are common and few people stay single, numbers are rising quickly, yet that signals room and food for many more, so the population is thin. If marriage is difficult and many people of both sexes stay single, the population is at a stand, probably because it is already large for the fertility of the land. Hume treated the number of unmarried footmen and housemaids in modern states as a sign of weak population. The author would draw the opposite conclusion, that it signals fullness, though he admits this is not certain, since many thinly peopled states are also stationary. His summary is that the proportion of unmarried persons "will form no criterion by which we can determine the actual population."

He then raises an apparent contradiction in the accounts of China. Those accounts say early marriage is very general across all Chinese ranks, yet Dr Adam Smith supposes that the population of China is stationary. The author writes that

these two circumstances appear to be irreconcilable.

He finds rapid growth unlikely, since every acre has long been cultivated and little yearly addition to the average produce can be expected. He suggests the universality of early marriage may not be well established. If it is true, the surplus population it creates must be held down by occasional famines and by the custom of exposing children, the abandonment of infants, which he expects is more common in hard times than Europeans ever hear. He calls the practice barbarous and says that nothing better shows the hunger people have suffered than a custom that violates "the most natural principle of the human heart." He believes it was widespread among ancient nations and tended rather to increase population.

Turning to modern Europe, the author observes that its major states have grown a great deal since they were nations of shepherds, but that their growth is now slow. Instead of doubling every twenty-five years, which is the pace the argument treats as possible, they need "three or four hundred years, or more, for that purpose." Some are stationary and others are shrinking. He rules out a decline in sexual desire as the cause:

The cause of this slow progress in population cannot be traced to a decay of the passion between the sexes.

The passion remains as strong as ever, so the question is why its effects do not show up in rapid growth.

His answer is that two checks work in combination. The first is a preventive check: a foresight of the difficulties attending the rearing of a family, which leads people to delay or avoid marriage. The second is a positive check: the actual distress of some of the lower classes, who cannot give their children proper food and care. England, as one of the most prosperous states in Europe, serves as his example, and he says the observations apply with little variation to any country where population grows slowly.

The preventive check, he argues, operates in some degree at every level of English society. Even some men in the highest rank are kept from marrying by the expenses they would have to cut and the pleasures they would have to give up. He calls these considerations trivial, but says the foresight becomes weightier further down. A man with a liberal education and an income just enough to keep him among gentlemen must feel certain that a family would force him, if he mixes in society at all, to rank himself with moderate farmers and the lower sort of tradesmen. A woman he would naturally choose has been raised to different tastes and would be pulled into a society entirely different from her own. Malthus says that "two or three steps of descent in society" at this point in the social ladder, where education ends and ignorance begins, "a real and essential evil" to most people. He grants that some break through these restraints, moved by stronger passion or weaker judgement, and that such love may sometimes outweigh its costs. Yet he concedes that "the more general consequences of such marriages are rather calculated to justify than to repress the forebodings of the prudent."

The sons of tradesmen and farmers are urged to hold off marrying until they have a business or farm that can support a family, which may not come until late in life. He notes that farms are scarce across England and that competition in every trade is too fierce for everyone to succeed.

The labourer earning eighteen pence a day is comfortable enough as a single man, and he hesitates before dividing that "pittance" among four or five, which is barely enough for one. He would accept harder work and poorer food for the woman he loves, but he knows that a large family and any misfortune could drive his children to starvation or force him to depend on the parish. The author values the love of independence and laments that the English parish law, "a system of all others the most calculated gradually to weaken this sentiment," may end by destroying it.

Servants in gentlemen's households have the strongest restraints of all. They enjoy nearly the same necessaries and comforts as their masters, their work is easy, and their sense of dependence is eased by the power to change employers. But they have neither knowledge nor capital for a trade or farm, and no practice at daily labour. Their likely refuge is a poor alehouse, which offers little hope of a happy life. Most of them, put off by this prospect, stay single where they are.

He concludes that the preventive check works, with varying force, through every class, and that the same is true of all long-settled countries. Its cost, he says, shows in the vices found across the world, which keep both sexes "continually involving both sexes in inextricable unhappiness."

The argument now turns to what the essay calls the positive check to population. By this it means the force that represses an increase which is already under way, as opposed to the preventive check of restraint before marriage. The essay says this check falls "chiefly, though not perhaps solely, to the lowest orders of society," meaning the poorest ranks. It is less visible than the other checks, and the author admits that proving its force and reach would need more data than was available. Still, the essay says that those who have studied bills of mortality, the parish records of deaths, have often noticed that a disproportionate share of the children who die each year belong to families unable to feed and care for them. Such families are exposed to severe distress, confined to unwholesome homes, and worn down by hard labour.

The essay says this mortality among poor children has been noticed in every town. In the countryside it is less marked, but no one has examined the question closely enough to rule out higher death rates among poor children even there. To make the point concrete, the essay asks the listener to imagine a labourer's wife with six children who is sometimes in want of bread, and doubts that she could always give them the food and care needed to keep them alive. The author draws on observation of country life. The sons of labourers, the essay says, are often stunted and slow to reach maturity. Boys who look fourteen or fifteen turn out, on inquiry, to be eighteen or nineteen. Ploughboys, whose work is healthy, rarely have any real calf to their legs, which the essay attributes to a lack of proper or sufficient nourishment. In its words,

The sons and daughters of peasants will not be found such rosy cherubs in real life as they are described to be in romances.

Next the essay turns to the English poor laws, the system of parish relief for the destitute. The poor laws were set up to ease everyday hardship. The essay fears that they may have softened individual misfortune a little, but have spread the general evil over a much larger surface. It notes a common puzzle: the immense sum collected each year for the poor still leaves so much distress. Some blame embezzlement, others say the church-wardens and overseers, the parish officers who ran relief, spend most of it on dinners. The essay's own answer is that "the fact that nearly three millions are collected annually for the poor and yet that their distresses are not removed is the subject of continual astonishment." A person who looks below the surface, it says, would be far more astonished if matters were otherwise. It adds that even if the rich paid eighteen shillings in the pound rather than four, the result would not materially change. A pound is twenty shillings, so the proposal compares paying nine tenths of income with paying a fifth.

To show why, the essay offers a thought experiment. Suppose the rich subscribed so that the eighteen pence a day that labourers earn became five shillings. One might imagine that they could then live comfortably and eat meat every day. The essay calls this a false conclusion. Moving three shillings and sixpence a day to each labourer would not increase the quantity of meat in the country, because there is not enough for everyone to have a decent share already. Buyers would compete, the price would rise from sixpence or sevenpence to two or three shillings a pound, and the same meat would be divided much as before. The essay explains the principle: "he that can shew the most valid patent, that is, he that offers most money, becomes the possessor." Here a patent means a person's claim on the nation's food, the money they can spend. If the competition led to more cattle being reared, that would come at the expense of corn, a bad exchange, since the country could then not support the same population. When subsistence is scarce compared with the number of people, the essay says, it matters little whether the lowest members of society have eighteen pence or five shillings. They must live on the hardest fare and in the smallest quantity.

The essay anticipates an objection. More buyers for every article, it is said, would spur productive industry and increase the whole produce of the island. The essay grants that this might happen to some degree, but says the spur it gives to population would more than counterbalance the gain. The extra produce would be shared among a more than proportionally increased number of people. The essay also points out that the calculation assumes the same amount of work would be done, which would not happen. Receiving five shillings a day instead of eighteen pence would make each man feel comparatively rich and inclined to take many hours or days of leisure. This would check productive industry. In a short time, the nation would be poorer, and the lower classes themselves would be more distressed than when they received only eighteen pence.

The essay applies the same reasoning to a collection of eighteen shillings in the pound from the rich. Even if distributed in the most judicious manner, it would have much the same effect, and no sacrifice by the rich, particularly in money, could for any length of time prevent distress among the lower members of society, whoever they were. Great changes might be made, and the rich might become poor and some of the poor rich. But part of society must still feel difficulty in living, and that difficulty will fall on the least fortunate.

The essay then makes what it calls a strange but true point: "I cannot by means of money raise a poor man and enable him to live much better than he did before, without proportionably depressing others in the same class." Its reasoning runs as follows. If a man cuts the food consumed in his own house and gives the saving to a poor neighbour, he benefits that neighbour without harming anyone except himself and his family. If he turns up uncultivated land and gives the produce away, he benefits both the poor man and society, since what the poor man consumed before joins the common stock, with some new produce as well. But if he only gives money, while the produce of the country stays the same, he gives the poor man a claim on a larger share of that produce, and the share cannot be received without reducing the shares of others. The essay says the effect in any single case is too small to be seen, but it is real, like some insects that fill the air and escape our grosser perceptions.

The essay holds that if the food of a country stays the same for many years, the food must be divided according to the value of each man's patent, or the money he can spend on this commodity, which is in universal demand. A footnote notes that the writer Mr Godwin calls the wealth a man inherits from his ancestors "a mouldy patent." The essay says it can properly be termed a patent but sees no reason to call it mouldy, since it is in such constant use. The essay calls it a demonstrative truth that one set of men's patents cannot rise in value without lowering the value of another set's. If the rich gave five shillings a day to five hundred thousand men without cutting their own tables, those men would live more at ease and consume more, leaving less food for the rest. Each man's patent would lose value, or the same silver would buy less subsistence.

An increase in population without a matching increase in food has the same effect. The food is spread in smaller portions, so a day's labour buys less. Prices can rise either because population outruns the means of subsistence, or because the money of the society is distributed differently. The essay observes that the food of a long-settled country grows slowly and regularly and cannot meet sudden demands, whereas shifts in the distribution of money are frequent and are among the causes of the continual changes in the price of provisions.

The essay then argues that the poor laws depress the condition of the poor in two ways. The first is that they increase population without increasing the food to support it. A poor man may marry with little or no prospect of supporting a family independently. The essay says the poor laws "may be said therefore in some measure to create the poor which they maintain." As the provisions must be spread over more people, the labour of those not supported by parishes buys less food, and more of them must be driven to ask for support. The second way is that provisions consumed in workhouses, the institutions where the destitute were housed, go to a part of society that the essay does not regard as the most valuable. This diminishes the shares that would otherwise go to more industrious and worthy members, and so forces still more people into dependence. If the workhouse poor were to live better, the new distribution would more conspicuously depress those outside, by raising the price of provisions.

The essay says that, fortunately for England, a spirit of independence still survives among the peasantry, and that the poor laws are strongly calculated to destroy it. They have succeeded in part, but if they had succeeded fully, their harmful tendency would not have stayed hidden so long.

Hard as it may appear in individual instances, dependent poverty ought to be held disgraceful.

The essay argues that this stimulus is needed for the happiness of most people, and that any general attempt to weaken it, however benevolent, will defeat its own purpose. If men marry expecting parish provision, they are tempted to bring unhappiness and dependence on themselves and their children, and, without knowing it, to injure everyone in their own class. The essay concludes that

A labourer who marries without being able to support a family may in some respects be considered as an enemy to all his fellow-labourers.

The essay has no doubt that the parish laws have helped raise the price of provisions and lower the real price of labour. They have therefore impoverished the people whose only possession is their labour. It is also hard to believe they have not powerfully encouraged the carelessness and lack of thrift seen among the poor, which contrast with the frugality often found among small shopkeepers and farmers. The essay says that

the labouring poor, to use a vulgar expression, seem always to live from hand to mouth.

Their present wants absorb their attention, and when they have a chance to save, anything beyond immediate needs goes, generally speaking, to the ale-house. The poor laws therefore diminish both the power and the will to save, weakening one of the strongest incentives to sobriety, industry, and happiness.

The essay adds that master manufacturers often complain that high wages ruin their workers. It finds it hard to believe these men would not save part of their high wages for their families, instead of spending it on drink and dissipation, if they did not rely on parish help in case of accident. Families of workers in a manufacturing town, the essay says, often fall on the parish as soon as a large factory fails, even though wages there had been well above ordinary country labour and could have funded saving until the workers found other work. A man who might resist the ale-house would hesitate to waste his earnings if he knew his wife and children would starve or depend on casual charity should he die or fall ill. The essay notes that in China, where both real and nominal wages are very low, sons are required by law to support their aged and helpless parents. It does not claim to decide whether such a law would be advisable in England. It argues, though, that positive institutions which make dependent poverty so common are improper, because they weaken the disgrace that should rightly attach to it.

The essay concludes that the happiness of the common people must be reduced when one of the strongest checks on idleness and dissipation is removed, and when men are tempted to marry with little or no means of supporting a family. Any obstacle to marriage is an unhappiness. Yet because some check on population must exist under the laws of our nature, the essay holds it better that the check come from foresight of the difficulties of a family and fear of dependent poverty, than that marriage be encouraged, only for the couple to be repressed later by want and sickness.

The essay then compares food with manufactured goods. Raw materials for manufactures are plentiful, so demand for those goods will call forth as many as are wanted. The demand for food, the essay says, "has by no means the same creative power." In a country where all the fertile land has been taken, high offers are needed to induce a farmer to spend on land that will not give a profitable return for some years. While the new produce is growing, great distress may be suffered for want of it. The demand for more subsistence is almost always present, yet the essay notes how slowly supply responds in countries that have long been settled.

The essay grants that the English poor laws were instituted with the most benevolent purpose, but says there is strong reason to think they have not achieved their aim. They do soften some cases of severe distress, yet the condition of the parish-supported poor, taken as a whole, is far from free of misery. The essay raises a further objection. Assistance that goes to one class subjects the whole body of common people to a set of "grating, inconvenient, and tyrannical laws," which it calls totally inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution. The settlement rules, it argues, are contrary to all ideas of freedom. It calls the parish pursuit of men whose families might become chargeable, and of poor women near childbirth, a disgraceful tyranny. The constraints placed on the labour market by these laws add to the difficulties of those struggling to support themselves without help.

The essay holds that some of these evils cannot be cured. Distributing help to a class of people requires that someone be given power to judge who deserves it and to run the institutions, and any large interference in other people's affairs is a kind of tyranny. The exercise of such power is likely to become grating to those who must ask for support. The essay says the tyranny of justices, church-wardens and overseers is a common complaint among the poor, but the fault lies less in these officers, who were probably no worse than other people before they took office, than in the nature of all such institutions. The evil may now have gone too far to be remedied. Still, the essay feels little doubt that had the poor laws never existed, there might have been a few more instances of very severe distress, but the total happiness of the common people would be much greater than it is now.

The essay then turns to Mr Pitt's Poor Bill. It says the bill appears framed with benevolent intentions, and that the outcry against it was in many respects ill-directed and unreasonable. Yet the bill has the great and radical defect of all such systems: it tends to increase population without increasing the means of supporting it, depressing the condition of those not supported by parishes and so creating more poor.

The essay regards removing the wants of the lower classes as an arduous task. The pressure of distress on this part of a community is an evil so deeply rooted that no human ingenuity can reach it. Palliatives, it says, are all the nature of the case allows, and it proposes three. The first is the total abolition of the present parish laws. This would give the peasantry liberty and freedom of action that they hardly possess now. They could settle without hindrance wherever there was more work and a higher wage, so the labour market would be free and the obstacles that now often stop wages rising with demand would be removed. The second is premiums for bringing new land into cultivation, and encouragements to agriculture above manufactures and to tillage above grazing. The essay wants institutions of corporations and apprenticeships, which make farm labour worse paid than trade and manufacture, weakened and destroyed, since a country cannot produce its proper quantity of food while those distinctions favour artisans. Such encouragement would supply the market with more healthy work, raise the relative price of labour, and improve the labourer's condition. Being better off and seeing no prospect of parish help, he would be more able and more inclined to join associations that insure against sickness for himself and his family. The third is county workhouses for extreme distress, supported by rates on the whole kingdom and open to persons of every county, and indeed every nation. The fare should be hard and all who are able should be made to work. They should not be comfortable refuges from every difficulty, but places where severe distress might find some relief. Part of these houses might be set aside as places where anyone, native or foreigner, could do a day's work at any time and receive the market price for it. The essay notes that many cases would still be left to individual benevolence.

The essay concludes that a plan of this kind, starting with the abolition of all the present parish laws, seems best calculated to increase the mass of happiness among the common people of England. It states that

To prevent the recurrence of misery, is, alas! beyond the power of man.

Pursuing what is impossible in the nature of things, the essay says, we sacrifice possible and certain benefits. We tell the common people that if they submit to a code of tyrannical regulations they will never be in want. They submit, and perform their part of the bargain, but we cannot perform ours. So the poor give up the valuable blessing of liberty and receive nothing that can be called a fair return.

Despite the poor laws, the essay thinks it will be allowed that, taking the lower classes altogether in towns and in the country, the distresses they suffer from want of proper and sufficient food, from hard labour, and from unwholesome dwellings must operate as a constant check to a population still beginning to grow. The essay names two great checks in all long-settled countries, the preventive and the positive, and adds vicious customs regarding women, great cities, unwholesome manufactures, luxury, pestilence, and war.

All these checks may be fairly resolved into misery and vice.

The essay says this is evident from the comparatively rapid growth of population that has invariably followed whenever these causes have been largely removed.

The author starts from a pattern he calls universally observed: "all new colonies settled in healthy countries, where there was plenty of room and food, have constantly increased with astonishing rapidity in their population." Some colonies from ancient Greece, he notes, came to equal their parent states in numbers and strength within a fairly short time. The European settlements in the New World, in his view, confirm the point, and he states the principle plainly:

A plenty of rich land, to be had for little or nothing, is so powerful a cause of population as to overcome all other obstacles.

The Spanish colonies in Mexico, Peru and Quito are his first test, and he describes them as badly run. In his account

The tyranny, superstition, and vices of the mother-country were introduced in ample quantities among her children.

The Crown imposed exorbitant taxes, the trade was hemmed in by severe restrictions, and the governors were as grasping for themselves as for the king. Even so, the colonies grew. He cites Ulloa for the claim that Lima, founded after the conquest, held about fifty thousand inhabitants almost fifty years earlier, and that Quito, once a village of Indians, was by Ulloa's time just as populous. Mexico is said to hold a hundred thousand people. The author allows that Spanish writers may have exaggerated, but he notes the figure is supposed to be five times what the city held in the time of Montezuma. Brazil, under a similarly harsh Portuguese rule, was thought thirty years earlier to have about six hundred thousand inhabitants of European descent. The Dutch and French colonies, run by exclusive companies of merchants, also kept thriving despite the disadvantage. He quotes Dr Adam Smith calling that arrangement, very justly in the author's telling, "the worst of all possible governments."

The English colonies of North America, the author argues, grew fastest of all. They had the same abundance of good land as the Spanish and Portuguese settlements, but also more liberty and equality. They were allowed to manage their own internal affairs, though their foreign trade was restricted. Land left uncultivated by its owner within a set time could be granted to someone else. Pennsylvania had no right of primogeniture, and in New England the eldest son received only a double share. The colonies had no tithes and hardly any taxes. Because good land was so cheap, capital could be put to no better use than farming, which in the author's words supplies "the greatest quantity of healthy work" and the most valuable produce to society. The result, he writes, was "a rapidity of increase probably without parallel in history." Across the northern colonies, the population doubled every twenty-five years. He gives a specific case: the four provinces of New England had 21,200 original settlers in 1643, and by 1760 they had reached half a million, even though more people had left than arrived. He takes these figures from Dr Price's Observations, and says he did not have the pamphlet by Dr Styles from which Price quotes. In New Jersey the doubling period was about twenty-two years, and in Rhode Island it was shorter still. In the back settlements, where people farmed and luxury was unknown, the population doubled in fifteen years, which he calls "a most extraordinary instance of increase." Along the sea coast, which was settled first, doubling took about thirty-five years, and some seaport towns did not grow at all.

He then qualifies the picture. Where land is plentiful, the earth can meet the demand for food that people make on it, but it would be a mistake to conclude that population and food grow at the same rate. In his phrase,

The one is still a geometrical and the other an arithmetical ratio, that is, one increases by multiplication, and the other by addition.

He illustrates this with a reservoir fed by a steady stream. When there are few people and much fertile land, the reservoir can be drawn on heavily, but it will empty sooner, and then only the stream remains. Once every acre is in use, further food depends on improving land already farmed, and even that gain shrinks. Population, if it could be fed, would keep growing with undiminished force, and each generation's growth would supply the strength for a larger one, with no limit in sight.

From these examples the author draws a general claim. Population grows "exactly in the proportion that the two great checks to it, misery and vice, are removed," and so "there is not a truer criterion of the happiness and innocence of a people than the rapidity of their increase." Crowded and unhealthy towns, which some workers are forced into by their trades, count as a kind of misery. So does any hesitation to marry because a family seems too hard to support. In short, he finds it hard to imagine any check on population that does not fall under misery or vice.

He then turns to Britain. The thirteen American states had about three million people before the war. The author argues that Britain has not become less populous for losing the emigrants who founded those colonies. Emigration, he says, is generally good for the population left behind, and the two Spanish provinces that sent the most people to America grew more populous as a result. This raises his central question: why does an equal number of British emigrants not produce an equal increase in Britain in the same time? His answer is "want of room and food," which he calls misery, and he holds that misery is an even stronger check than vice. He points to how quickly old states recover from war, plague or natural disaster. Such places are briefly placed in the position of new states, and the result is what one would expect. If the inhabitants' industry has not been destroyed by fear or tyranny, food supply soon rises above what the smaller population needs, and a population that had been nearly stationary begins at once to grow.

He offers several cases. Flanders, often the scene of destructive wars, has after a short respite always appeared as fruitful and populous as ever. The Palatinate recovered after the ravages of Louis the Fourteenth. The great plague of London in 1666 was no longer noticeable fifteen or twenty years later. The traces of the worst famines in China and Indostan, by all accounts, were soon wiped out. He doubts that Turkey and Egypt are on average much less populous because of the plagues that regularly strike them. If their numbers are lower than before, he suggests the cause lies more in the tyranny and oppression of their governments, which discourage farming, than in the plagues. Great natural disasters such as volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, unless they are so frequent as to drive people away or destroy their industry, have only a slight effect on a state's average population. Naples and the country around Vesuvius remain densely settled despite repeated eruptions. Lisbon and Lima, he says, are probably in much the same demographic state as they were before their last earthquakes.

The author opens with a claim about disease. Although the plague seems to have been driven out of London through great attention to cleanliness, the author argues that crowding and poor food may be among the secondary causes of sickly seasons and epidemics. "The plague seems at length to be completely expelled from London," the author writes, but "a crowded population and unwholesome and insufficient food" still need to be counted as causes of illness.

To test this, the author turns to tables compiled by the German demographer Mr Suessmilch, which Dr Price had extracted in a note. The author calls them very correct. The tables record births, burials and marriages in several regions of Prussia, Pomerania, Neumark and Magdeburgh, averaged over periods of several years. In the Prussian table, births outnumbered burials by 150 to 100 in the decade to 1702, by 180 to 100 in the five years to 1716, and by 148 to 100 in the five years to 1756. A note in the table records that a pestilence in 1709 and 1710 carried off 247,733 inhabitants of that country, and the author observes that the greatest ratio of births to burials came in the five years after that pestilence.

The Pomeranian figures show the population almost doubling over fifty-six years with no serious epidemic to interrupt the growth. The three years after the last period, however, were so sickly that births fell to 10,229 and burials rose to 15,068. The author asks,

Is it not probable that in this case the number of inhabitants had increased faster than the food and the accommodations necessary to preserve them in health?

In that reading, people were forced to live harder and crowd together, and those conditions helped produce the sickly years. A country need not be densely settled for this to happen. If population grows before more food is grown and more houses are built, people suffer for room and subsistence. The author imagines England with more marriages than usual for eight or ten years. Where five or six people shared a cottage there would now be seven or eight, and "this, added to the necessity of harder living, would probably have a very unfavourable effect on the health of the common people." The Neumark and Magdeburgh tables show the same pattern, with epidemics checking growth in some years and several sickly years recorded. The author concludes that "a scantiness of room and food was one of the principal causes that occasioned them."

The author then makes a distinction that matters for the rest of the essay. Checks on population are of two kinds. Positive checks raise the death rate, through disease, famine and similar causes. Preventive checks lower the birth rate, for example by delaying marriage. The tables suggest that in these countries the checks were "rather of the positive, than of the preventive kind." When rising plenty eases the pressure on the labourer, people marry young, and population can keep growing past what the land produces. Sickly seasons then follow as the natural result. The author expects that countries whose food barely matches their demand for it will suffer more periodic epidemics than countries whose population fits their average produce. The reverse should also hold. In countries prone to periodic sickness, births exceed burials by more in the years between outbreaks. The author notes that Turkey and Egypt were nearly stationary in population over the last century, and that in the gaps between their plagues births must have outrun burials by more than in France and England.

From this the author draws a methodological warning. The ratio of births to burials over five or ten years, he writes, "will hence appear to be a very inadequate criterion by which to judge of its real progress in population." Such a ratio shows the rate of increase during those years, but it cannot reveal what happened in the twenty years before or what will happen in the twenty years after. Dr Price had argued that Sweden, Norway, Russia and the kingdom of Naples were growing fast, but the register extracts he used covered periods too short to prove it. The author thinks Sweden, Norway and Russia are probably growing, though more slowly than short-run ratios suggest. For Naples, the ratio of 144 to 100 for the five years to 1777 would, the author says, "indicate an increase much greater than would be really found to have taken place in that kingdom during a period of a hundred years."

Dr Short's comparison of English village and market town registers makes the same point. Between the Elizabethan era and the middle of the seventeenth century, births exceeded burials by 124 to 100. From the late seventeenth century to the middle of the eighteenth, the ratio was 111 to 100. Dr Price doubted the earlier registers, but the author thinks they probably give accurate proportions. Two reasons support a bigger surplus of births early on. First, in the early stages of a country's growth, more good land is brought under cultivation. The author adds "caeteris paribus," a Latin phrase meaning other things being equal, because the growth of food also depends on the spirit of industry, the knowledge and habits of the people, and the degree of civil liberty and equality. Second, the plague years in the earlier period probably pushed the ratio up. Had those years been left out as accidental, the registers would likely overstate the real average increase. The author also notes that England may have been more populous at the Revolution than it is now, which would fit a surge of births in the years after the Great Plague of 1666.

The author then looks at Mr King's figure for England outside London in 1693, 115 to 100, and Dr Short's 111 to 100 including London, along with France's 117 to 100 over the five years to 1774. If these figures are near the truth and there were no large swings, France and England have adjusted their populations to the average produce of each country. The author lists the forces behind this adjustment:

the discouragements to marriage, the consequent vicious habits, war, luxury, the silent though certain depopulation of large towns, and the close habitations, and insufficient food of many of the poor.

These, he says, keep population from growing past the means of subsistence and "supercede the necessity of great and ravaging epidemics to repress what is redundant." He offers a thought experiment. If a wasting plague swept away two million people in England and six million in France, the ratio of births to burials would afterwards rise well above present levels.

For contrast, the author cites New Jersey, where births to deaths averaged 300 to 100 over the seven years to 1743, against 117 to 100 for France and England at their highest. He does not want readers to treat this gap as a miracle. Its causes, he says, are near and open to investigation, and nature works by fixed laws. He states the principle in algebraic terms:

The passion between the sexes has appeared in every age to be so nearly the same that it may always be considered, in algebraic language, as a given quantity.

The law of necessity, that population cannot grow beyond the food it can produce or acquire, is so obvious that he treats it as beyond doubt. The ways nature enforces it are less regular, but while we cannot always predict the mode, we can predict the fact. If births outrun deaths far beyond what the food supply allows, deaths will soon overtake them unless emigration takes place.

The author then makes his central claim about measuring growth:

The only true criterion of a real and permanent increase in the population of any country is the increase of the means of subsistence.

Some populations grow without that increase. China is his example. He says the lower classes there live on the smallest possible quantity of food and eat scraps European labourers would refuse. A Chinese law permitting parents to expose their children has, in his view, forced population upward. A nation in that state must suffer famines, because when population barely fits the average produce, any bad harvest is fatal. He suggests that the frugal diet of the Gentoos, the Hindu peoples of India, contributes to the famines of Indostan. In America, by contrast, wages are high and labourers could cut back in a bad year without serious distress, so famine seems almost impossible there. He expects that as America fills up, wages will fall and population will grow without a matching rise in food.

The author compares national habits of eating. The labourers of southern England are so used to fine wheaten bread that they would sooner starve than live as Scottish peasants do. Over time, by the hard law of necessity, they might be reduced to a diet like that of the Lower Chinese and support more people on the same food. He calls that an abortive attempt that every friend of humanity should hope to see fail. He also takes aim at the common call for more population. The tendency to increase is so strong, he says, that one must ask why population does not respond when encouragement is offered. His answer: "the demand for a greater population is made without preparing the funds necessary to support it." The proper approach is to raise the demand for farm labour by encouraging cultivation, which increases the country's produce and improves the labourer's condition. Any other method is, in his words, "vicious, cruel, and tyrannical."

He then turns to Mr Pitt's Poor Bill. He acquits Mr Pitt of any sinister intent in the clause that allows a shilling a week to every labourer for each child above three. The author admits that he had once thought the measure beneficial, but reflection convinced him that it would defeat its own purpose. Because it adds people without adding produce, the same food must be divided among more mouths. A day's labour then buys less, and "the poor therefore in general must be more distressed."

The author accepts that population may grow for a time without matching growth in food, but he insists the variation has a limit. In any country that is not shrinking, food must be enough to sustain and renew the labouring population. He sums up with a comparison: "countries are populous according to the quantity of human food which they produce, and happy according to the liberality with which that food is divided." Corn countries support more people than pasture countries, and rice countries more than corn countries. England's land is unsuited to rice, but it could grow potatoes. Dr Adam Smith is cited as saying that if potatoes became the main food of the common people, and the land now given to corn were planted with them, England could support a far larger population.

The happiness of a nation, the author argues, depends neither on its wealth nor its poverty, its youth nor its age, nor on whether it is thinly or densely settled. It depends on how fast the nation is growing and how closely the yearly increase of food keeps pace with the yearly increase of an unrestricted population. That match is closest in new colonies, where an old state's knowledge and industry work on fertile unclaimed land. Otherwise, the age of a state matters little. He suggests that Britain's food is divided as generously now as it was thousands of years ago, and that the poor of the thinly settled Scottish Highlands suffer from overcrowding as much as the rich and populous province of Flanders.

He also imagines a country left to develop on its own, without invasion or outside influence, from the time its produce could be counted as one unit to the time it could be counted as a million. Across many centuries, the mass of people would never be free from distress, direct or indirect, caused by want of food. In every European state with a record, millions upon millions of lives have been cut short by this simple cause, even where outright famine was never known.

Famine, he says, is "the last, the most dreadful resource of nature." Population has far more power to grow than the earth has to feed it, so premature death must come in some form. The vices of mankind are active agents of depopulation and often finish the work themselves. If they fail, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence and plague advance and sweep away thousands. If that is still not enough, famine follows and levels population with the food supply of the world.

The author closes the argument with three propositions that he says the history of mankind confirms. The first is

That the increase of population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence.

The second is

That population does invariably increase when the means of subsistence increase.

The third holds that the superior power of population is repressed, and the actual population kept equal to the means of subsistence, by misery and vice. The author presents these as established by the record of every age and every state.

The chapter turns to writers on the perfectibility of man and society, and finds them too relaxed about population. Malthus says these writers treat the argument of an overcharged population very slightly and place its difficulties at a great and almost immeasurable distance. He singles out Mr Wallace, who thought the argument strong enough to destroy his whole system of equality, yet did not seem to see any difficulty arising until the whole earth had been cultivated like a garden and could produce no further increase.

Malthus's reply is that if his own view of the argument is right, the difficulty is not remote at all. He writes that the difficulty, "so far from being remote, would be imminent and immediate." At every stage of cultivation between the present day and that imagined garden-earth, the distress for want of food would press on all mankind if they were equal. Even while the produce of the earth rose each year, population would rise much faster, and the surplus would have to be held back by "the periodical or constant action of misery or vice."

He then turns to Mr Condorcet's Esquisse, a sketch of the progress of the human mind written, it is said, under the threat of the proscription that ended in Condorcet's death. Malthus notes that the sketch is only an outline of a larger work that was never completed, so it lacks the detail needed to prove a theory. Still, he says, a few observations will show how completely the theory fails once it is applied to the real state of things rather than an imagined one.

The author sets out Condorcet's argument. Comparing the populations of the civilised nations of Europe with their territory, cultivation, division of labour and means of subsistence, Condorcet concludes that the same population could not be kept without a class who have no other means of supplying their wants than their industry. Malthus quotes him: "There exists then, a necessary cause of inequality, of dependence, and even of misery, which menaces, without ceasing, the most numerous and active class of our societies." Malthus calls the difficulty just and well stated, but doubts the remedy.

Condorcet's remedy was a fund built on calculations of the probabilities of life and the interest of money. It would assure support to the old, paid partly from their own savings and partly from the savings of those who die before they can benefit. It would also aid widows and orphans and provide capital to those of an age to found a new family. Condorcet suggested such establishments could be made in the name and under the protection of society, and that calculation could spread credit beyond great fortunes.

Malthus answers that such establishments, promising as they look on paper, will be found in real life to be "absolutely nugatory." He argues that Condorcet himself accepts that a class maintaining itself by industry is necessary, and the only reason to accept it is that labour needs the goad of necessity. If the idle and the negligent are placed on the same footing as the active and industrious, the animated activity that now drives public prosperity would be lost. An inquisition to judge each person's exertions, he writes, would be "little else than a repetition upon a larger scale of the English poor laws," and would destroy liberty and equality.

Even setting that objection aside, Malthus says, the greater difficulty remains. If every man were sure of a comfortable provision for his family, almost every man would have one, and with the rising generation free from misery, population must grow rapidly. Condorcet saw this himself. He wrote that "each generation will be called to more extended enjoyments, and in consequence, by the physical constitution of the human frame, to an increase in the number of individuals." Condorcet asked whether these laws must then counteract each other, leaving either a retrograde movement or a kind of oscillation between good and evil, a constant cause of periodical misery that would mark a limit to human perfectibility.

Malthus agrees that this oscillation will certainly take place and will be a constantly subsisting cause of periodical misery. He disagrees only about when it applies. Condorcet placed that period in the far distance. Malthus argues that if his own proportion between the natural increase of population and food is near the truth, the period when the number of men surpasses their means of subsistence "has long since arrived." On this view the oscillation has existed ever since histories of mankind began, does exist now, and will continue to exist unless the physical constitution of human nature changes.

Finally, Malthus turns to Condorcet's reassurance that when that period came, the advocates of perfectibility need not be alarmed. Condorcet thought that by then superstition would no longer corrupt morals, and he alluded to a promiscuous concubinage that would prevent breeding, or to something equally unnatural. Malthus says he cannot follow this, and that such a remedy would destroy the very virtue and purity of manners which the advocates of equality and of the perfectibility of man profess to seek.

The last question Condorcet proposes for examination is the organic perfectibility of man, meaning whether the human body and its natural faculties themselves can be improved, not just the conditions of society. Condorcet argues that if people can keep advancing with their present nature, then changing that nature would make the hope even greater. He lists the routes: better medicine, more wholesome food and housing, exercise that strengthens the body without excess, the removal of misery and of too great riches, and the gradual elimination of transmissible and contagious disorders. From these he infers that human life will not become absolutely immortal, but that the time between birth and natural death will keep increasing with no assignable term, which he says "may properly be expressed by the word 'indefinite'."

The author rejects this use of the word in the strongest terms. He says that applying it to the duration of human life is "in the highest degree unphilosophical and totally unwarranted by any appearances in the laws of nature." Climate, food, and manners do change how long people live, but those variations are different in kind from a regular and unretrograde increase. He writes that "it may be fairly doubted whether there is really the smallest perceptible advance in the natural duration of human life since first we have had any authentic history of man." He admits that the prejudices of every age point the same way, and says he would not put much weight on them, but he thinks they at least suggest there has been no marked advance.

He then takes up the objection that the world is still too young for such differences to show. His answer is that if this were so, there would be an end of all human science. Reasoning from effects to causes would be destroyed, and

we may shut our eyes to the book of nature.

Newton's theory would stand on the same footing as Descartes's hypotheses. The constancy of nature's laws is the foundation of knowledge. He does not deny that the power which made those laws could change them, but he says a change cannot be inferred from reasoning. Without any observable sign of change, one could just as well claim that the moon will strike the earth tomorrow as that the sun will rise at its usual time. For the duration of life, no lasting sign of increasing prolongation has appeared in all the ages of the world. The effects of climate, habit, and diet have provided the pretext, but the argument rests on a weak base: because the limit of human life is undefined, it is claimed that its extent "may increase for ever, and be properly termed indefinite or unlimited."

To show why this reasoning fails, the author turns to animals and plants. Breeders hold that one can breed to any degree of refinement, because some offspring will show the desired qualities more strongly than their parents. He uses the Leicestershire sheep, bred for small heads and legs. Followed without limit, this maxim would shrink the heads and legs to nothing, which is plainly absurd, so the premise must be wrong and a limit must exist even if it cannot be located. He draws a clear line between a limit that is undefined and an improvement that is unlimited. He says he cannot name where the improvement stops, but he can name a point it will never reach: "were the breeding to continue for ever, the head and legs of these sheep would never be so small as the head and legs of a rat." Animals, therefore, are not indefinitely perfectible.

Plants show a more striking change. Garden flowers have grown much larger under cultivation, but the same logic applies. Gardeners competing for prizes have often applied stronger fertiliser without success. The author says that no one can claim to have seen the finest carnation or anemone that could ever be grown. Yet he could say with complete certainty that no carnation or anemone could be cultivated to the size of a large cabbage, and a cabbage is still far below the assignable quantities that exist.

No man can say that he has seen the largest ear of wheat, or the largest oak that could ever grow; but he might easily, and with perfect certainty, name a point of magnitude at which they would not arrive.

In every case, he says, we should distinguish between an unlimited progress and a progress whose limit is merely undefined.

Someone might say that plants and animals cannot grow indefinitely because they would collapse under their own weight. The author replies that this too is known only from experience, through the strength of the materials these bodies are made from. A carnation stalk would fail long before it reached the size of a cabbage, but many natural substances of that size could support a head as heavy as a cabbage. The causes of plant mortality are still unknown. Some plants are annual, some biennial, and some last for ages, and no one can say why. Human mortality is the same kind of question. The author concludes that man is mortal because all experience shows that the materials of his visible body are mortal, and he puts the principle plainly:

What can we reason, but from what we know?

Sound philosophy, he says, will not let him change this view until it can be "clearly proved that the human race has made, and is making, a decided progress towards an illimitable extent of life."

The purpose of the examples, he explains, was to expose the fallacy of inferring an unlimited progress from a partial improvement whose limit cannot be precisely found. Plants and animals have clearly improved to a degree, and it would still be absurd to say that the improvement has no limit. For humans, it may be doubted that any organic improvement at all can be clearly shown since the world began. So the arguments for the organic perfectibility of man are, in his view, unusually weak, and amount to conjectures. Still, he does not think it impossible that breeding could bring about some improvement in people, similar to what has happened with animals. Intellect might not be transmissible, but size, strength, beauty, complexion, and perhaps even longevity are passed on to some degree. The mistake, he says, is not in supposing a small improvement is possible, but in failing to distinguish a small improvement with an undefined limit from a truly unlimited one. He adds that breeding humans in this way would mean condemning the poorer specimens to celibacy, so it is unlikely ever to become general. He jokes that the only serious attempt he knows of was in the ancient family of the Bickerstaffs, said to have whitened their skins and increased their height through prudent marriages, including a judicious cross with Maud, the milk-maid.

He adds that proving the mortality of man is not necessary to show how improbable immortality on earth is. An increase in the length of life would also add considerable weight to the argument about population, but he does not need to make that case here. He expects that many readers will think it a waste of time to argue seriously against so absurd a paradox, and that such fanciful claims are best ignored. He disagrees. Ingenious and able men who advance paradoxes take neglect as a sign of their contemporaries' narrowness, and they conclude that the world is not yet ready for their truths. A candid investigation, he argues, may persuade them that unfounded hypotheses do not enlarge the bounds of human science but contract them, and that they obstruct the progress of the mind. He warns that such speculation throws us back toward the infancy of knowledge and weakens the very method under which science has recently advanced so quickly.

He describes the present fashion for sweeping speculation as "a kind of mental intoxication," likely produced by the great discoveries of recent years. People made giddy by those successes thought everything was within reach, and they confused subjects where no real progress could be shown with subjects where progress was clear and acknowledged. He hopes they could be made to think more soberly, because truth and sound philosophy suffer when wild flights and unsupported assertions replace patient investigation and well-authenticated proof. Finally, he presents Condorcet's book as more than the opinions of one celebrated individual. It sketches the views of many literary men in France at the start of the Revolution, and for that reason, though it is only a sketch, he judges it worthy of attention.

Chapter 10 turns from Godwin's account of human institutions to a thought experiment that tests his ideal against arithmetic. The chapter opens with a measured verdict. The author finds Political Justice a work of real force and spirit, but says its conclusions are often unwarranted by its premises, and that its conjectures far outstrip what nature allows. He admits the system of equality Godwin proposes is the most beautiful and engaging of its kind, with its appeal to reason rather than force and its substitution of benevolence for self-love. Still, he calls it little better than a dream, "a beautiful phantom of the imagination."

The author then quotes Godwin's own statement on population:

There is a principle in human society, by which population is perpetually kept down to the level of the means of subsistence.

The author says this principle, which Godwin mentions but does not investigate, is what he calls "the grinding law of necessity, misery, and the fear of misery."

His central objection is that Godwin attributes almost all the vices and misery of civil society to human institutions. The author argues that institutions are only "mere feathers that float on the surface" compared with deeper causes of human misery. To show this, he quotes Godwin's picture of a society of plenty in which envy, malice and selfishness would vanish, and then sets against it his own sober reply:

Man cannot live in the midst of plenty. All cannot share alike the bounties of nature.

To test Godwin's answer to the problem of an overcharged population, the author quotes Godwin's claim that

Myriads of centuries of still increasing population may pass away, and the earth be still found sufficient for the subsistence of its inhabitants.

The author calls this a view of the problem that sees too far off. He then asks the reader to imagine Godwin's equal society realized in its purest form, on an island the size of this one. He removes war, unhealthy trades and large cities, gives every household clean and roomy housing, and keeps the population and produce at their present levels. Food would be vegetable, with meat occasionally, and would still suffice for health.

On marriage, the author says Godwin regards it as a fraud and a monopoly, and imagines relations between the sexes made wholly free. The author agrees that this would not lead to promiscuity, since he judges the love of variety a corrupt taste that would not prevail in a simple, virtuous society. He thinks such a society would be very favourable to population. Because no one would fear for the support of children, he writes that he does not "conceive that there would be one woman in a hundred, of twenty-three, without a family."

To fix a rate of increase, the author draws on a pamphlet by a Dr Styles, cited by Dr Price, which reports that the back settlements of America doubled their numbers in fifteen years. He reasons that England is healthier, and its encouragements to a family greater, so the population should double in fifteen years or less. To stay on the safe side, he assumes a doubling every twenty-five years, a rate he says is well known in the Northern States of America.

He then grants Godwin every advantage on production. Equal property and an agricultural economy would raise output, but Godwin's allowance of half an hour's labour a day per man would not be enough. The author judges that half of each man's time would be needed, and even then doubts that average produce could double in twenty-five years. He explains the soil problem: English land yields little without dressing, and dressing depends on cattle, so ploughing up grazing land would undermine the manure it needs. He contrasts China, where some provinces are said to yield two rice crops a year without dressing, which he says is not true of any English land.

The arithmetic follows. The author grants that the island's produce might double in the first twenty-five years, feeding a doubled population of fourteen million. In the second period he doubts any increase, but grants one equal to the present yield anyway. Even so, seven million would be unprovided for: food for twenty-one million would have to feed twenty-eight million. He carries the sum on, and says that before the first century ends, the population would reach one hundred and twelve million, with food for only thirty-five million, leaving seventy-seven million without means of support.

He immediately concedes that such numbers could never exist, since the calculation is an argument about pressure, not a forecast. He restates Godwin's principle and asks what it is. Is it an obscure cause, or heaven's interference? Or is it a cause open to research, "a degree of misery, the necessary and inevitable result of the laws of nature," which human institutions have tended to soften but never remove?

The chapter then imagines how institutions would arise under this pressure. As food grew scarce, the author writes, some violations of property would follow, and an assembly would be called. It would decide that a more complete division of land and the protection of each man's stock, "by the most powerful sanctions, even by death itself," were required. The author admits that surplus produce might not be shared freely, but argues that the insecurity of property would be a worse evil. Next, he argues that the pressure would make some check on population necessary, and that the most natural one is for each man to provide for his own children. Marriage, or at least an obligation to support one's children, would follow.

From this he derives the greater disgrace attached to a woman's breach of chastity. Women could not support their children, and a man who deserted a woman would leave the children to the society. The author argues that the custom of blaming the woman was a means of preventing this inconvenience, and that the father's identity is less certain than the mother's. He calls the result "a breach of natural justice," but says that the custom's origin is now lost, and that it bears hardest where it is least needed.

With property and marriage established, inequality of condition follows. Those born after the division of land come into a world already possessed, and cannot claim a share of others' surplus as a debt of justice. The author says some human beings must suffer want, "the unhappy persons who, in the great lottery of life, have drawn a blank." Owners of surplus would select labourers by some mark more obvious than moral merit, and would generally favour those willing to produce more. The author then describes the wage fund, the aggregate food held by owners beyond their own consumption. When that fund is large relative to claimants, wages are high and families thrive. When it is small, labour is ill paid and population checked by sickness and misery.

The author's conclusion is that a society built on the most beautiful principles, with benevolence in place of self-love, would from the laws of nature alone, and not from any original depravity, degenerate into a society of proprietors and labourers, "with self-love the main-spring of the great machine." He reasons that if the doubling period were fifteen years, not twenty-five, the collapse would come within thirty years, not after myriads of centuries. He sets emigration aside, but notes that people rarely leave their own country even when starving, so such a society would keep its members in place until its principle was destroyed.

The essay now turns to the idea it has been testing, that the passion between the sexes might one day die out and make a perfect society possible. The author calls this a conjecture with little to support it. The same natural causes that would destroy such a society quickly, were it established, would also prevent it from ever being established, and nothing in the record suggests those causes are changing.

No move towards the extinction of the passion between the sexes has taken place in the five or six thousand years that the world has existed.

The author then weighs the judgments of those who condemn love.

Men in the decline of life have in all ages declaimed against a passion which they have ceased to feel, but with as little reason as success.

People who have never felt love because of a cold temperament, the essay says, are poor judges of its power to add to the pleasures of life. People who spent their youth in excess, and face bodily weakness and remorse in old age, are no better guides, since they judge pleasure by the ruin it left them. The essay's own position is that "the pleasures of pure love will bear the contemplation of the most improved reason, and the most exalted virtue." Many people who have known the real delight of virtuous love, it suggests, look back on that period as the brightest stretch of their lives.

The essay grants that intellectual pleasures have their own advantages.

The superiority of intellectual to sensual pleasures consists rather in their filling up more time, in their having a larger range, and in their being less liable to satiety, than in their being more real and essential.

Yet it warns that every enjoyment defeats itself when pursued without restraint. A fine walk taken too far ends in fatigue, and the most wholesome food eaten without limit produces weakness. Intellectual pleasures pursued with too little rest also wear down the body and impair the mind. In the essay's view, arguing against the reality of these pleasures from their abuse is hardly fair.

On morality, the essay sets out two definitions. Mr Godwin, it says, takes morality to be "a calculation of consequences," while Archdeacon Paley expresses it as "the will of God, as collected from general expediency." By either account, a sensual pleasure that carries no likelihood of unhappy consequences does not break the laws of morality. If it is enjoyed with enough temperance to leave ample room for intellectual pursuits, it adds to the total of pleasurable sensations in life. The essay concludes that virtuous love, raised by friendship, is the mix of sensual and intellectual enjoyment best suited to human nature.

The essay then tests Godwin's claim that sexual pleasure is inferior. It quotes him: "Strip the commerce of the sexes of all its attendant circumstances, and it would be generally despised." The author answers with an analogy. Asking what beauty a bare pole has, once its branches and foliage are stripped away, misses the point that it was the whole tree, with its branches, that drew admiration. A single feature of an object, the essay argues, can stir emotions quite different from the whole, as a beautiful woman and a map of Madagascar differ. Love is stirred by "the symmetry of person, the vivacity, the voluptuous softness of temper, the affectionate kindness of feelings, the imagination and the wit" of a woman, not by her sex alone. Men driven by desire have done great harm to society, but the essay doubts they would have found it hard to resist a temptation that offered nothing but sex.

Reason, the essay holds, is the proper guide in every pursuit of enjoyment, because it is the faculty that calculates consequences. Improved reason will likely check the abuse of sensual pleasure, the author says, though that does not mean it will extinguish such pleasure.

The author returns to the method at the heart of the argument. He has tried to expose the error of inferring an unlimited progress from a partial improvement whose limits cannot be fixed. Many cases show a real advance that would be absurd to treat as boundless. But "towards the extinction of the passion between the sexes, no observable progress whatever has hitherto been made." A claim of extinction is therefore, in the essay's words, an unfounded conjecture, unsupported by any philosophical probabilities.

The essay admits that history shows some of the most gifted minds indulging in sensual love, moderately or immoderately. Even granting that great intellectual exertion may loosen this passion's hold on a person, the author argues that the mass of mankind would have to be improved far beyond the brightest figures of the age before any difference could sensibly affect population. The author does not claim the mass has reached its limit of improvement. The essay's principal argument, though, makes it improbable that the lower classes of any country will ever be free enough from want and labour to reach a high degree of intellectual improvement.

The author turns to Godwin's claim that the mind can prolong life by overcoming the body. Godwin observes that good news can dissipate a distemper, and that a man who walks twenty miles in an indolent temper is tired, while the same man walking twenty miles full of ardour comes in as fresh as when he began. The author grants that mind and body are closely connected, but argues that nearly all of these examples concern mental stimulants acting on the body, and that such stimulants cannot be applied continually with equal strength. Where a stimulus draws its power from novelty and surprise, the author writes,

Such a stimulus cannot, from its nature, be repeated often with the same effect, as it would by repetition lose that property which gives it its strength.

The author also objects to the method of the argument. It moves from a small and partial effect to a great and general one, which the author says will in numberless instances be found to be "a very fallacious mode of reasoning." A busy man may disregard slight disorders of the frame, but that does not show that activity of mind lets him disregard a high fever, the smallpox, or the plague.

Taking the walker as an example, the author argues that the length of his walk depends on muscle and not on mind. Double his motive, have him walk another twenty miles, and then quadruple it, and his walk ends where his muscles give out. A motive of uncommon power might drive a man to kill himself with exertion, but it would not make him walk a hundred miles in twenty-four hours. The author states the principle plainly:

The mind cannot fix its attention strongly on more than one object at once.

The walker was tired on the first twenty miles but did not feel it, because his thoughts were on his reward. If he had really been as fresh as when he set off, he could walk the second twenty miles with as much ease as the first, and the author calls the conclusion that he could keep going forever "a palpable absurdity."

The author adds further cases. A spirited horse, spurred and well handled, may look as fresh as if it had not gone a mile, and the horse may feel no fatigue while excited. The cry of hounds can make tired horses look lively after forty miles, yet they tire sooner when hunted hard at the end of the day. The author recalls long days with a gun, returning tired on some occasions and fresh on others, with no difference in stiffness or sore feet the next morning. From these cases the author concludes:

In all these cases, stimulants upon the mind seem to act rather by taking off the attention from the bodily fatigue, than by really and truly counteracting it.

The author also describes a bad toothache, which is forgotten for a moment while writing, although the pain goes on and the nerves still demand attention.

The author does not deny that a sound and vigorous mind helps keep the body in good order. The body, however, seems to have more effect on the mind than the reverse. The mind's first duty is to supply the body's wants. An active mind may wander over the fields of science or the regions of imagination, and may fancy that it has "shuffled off this mortal coil," but the body always catches up:

The slowly moving tortoise, the body, never fails to overtake the mind, however widely and extensively it may have ranged.

Even the brightest intellects must give way to hunger or to sleep. The immortality of the mind, the author says, does not imply the immortality of the body. Very great intellectual exertions tend to "wear out the scabbard," and so the stimulants Godwin cites would, if applied continually, "tend very rapidly to destroy the human frame."

On Godwin's second point, that some men have a voluntary power over parts of their bodies that others lack, the author replies that these are exceptions to an almost universal rule, and that they seem "rather tricks, than powers that may be exerted to any good purpose." The author has never heard of anyone who could regulate his pulse in a fever, and doubts that any of the persons cited have made a perceptible gain in correcting their own disorders or prolonging their lives.

The author then challenges Godwin's claim that it is unphilosophical to conclude that a power beyond our present observation is beyond the limits of the human mind. The author sees a clear difference between a philosophical conjecture and the prophecies of Mr Brothers: one is founded on indications from present observation, and "the other has no foundation at all." Expecting future discoveries is reasonable, but once conjectures leave past experience behind, "any one supposition is then just as good as another." If someone claimed that men would one day have eyes and hands behind them, the author would reject it for lack of any indication in the past.

The author accepts that many discoveries were unforeseen, but notes that a person who predicted them without any analogy from past facts would be a prophet and not a philosopher. Savages would be amazed by a watch, yet the perpetual motion that has eluded the most acute minds is no less impossible. Early telescope makers expected larger instruments to bring greater power, but experience showed the limits set by the smallness of the field, the deficiency of light and the magnification of the atmosphere. Some fields of knowledge keep advancing while others are constantly baffled, and experience helps us judge at least what we are not to expect.

Returning to sleep, the author argues that the need for it depends on the body rather than the mind, so improving the mind cannot greatly supersede it. Someone who stays awake for two or three nights through mental excitement only exhausts his body, and his understanding suffers in turn. The author then compares character and longevity. No decided effect of intellect on the length of life has been observed. A man who takes temperate meals and regular exercise is generally healthier than a deeply absorbed intellectual who forgets his bodily needs. A retired citizen who tends his garden may live as long as the most far-ranging philosopher. Women, on average, live longer than men, and the author suggests that this is partly because fewer women are drawn into vigorous mental exertion.

The author concludes that the mortality of man on earth "seems to be as completely established, and exactly upon the same grounds, as any one, the most constant, of the laws of nature." Supposing that human life could be prolonged without limit is as unphilosophical, the author says, as supposing that the attraction of the earth will turn into repulsion, or that the earth will one day fly off toward a warmer sun. The author judges Godwin's picture beautiful and desirable, but like landscapes drawn from fancy, it lacks the interest that nature and probability alone can give.

The author then turns to the conjectures of Godwin and Condorcet as a striking case of "the longing of the soul after immortality." Both men reject revelation and natural religion, yet they cannot give up the idea of immortality entirely. They offer instead an immortality reserved for a few beings, while all the great and virtuous minds of past and future ages are sunk in annihilation. The author says that had such a doctrine been offered as revealed religion, these critics would have ridiculed it as "the most iniquitously unjust." This, the author says, shows "the inconsistency of scepticism."

The author argues that the resurrection of a spiritual body from a natural one is no more wonderful than a grain of wheat or an acorn producing a plant. An intelligent being who had only seen inanimate or full-grown things would not guess that a seed could choose its nourishment and build a plant. Such a being would need stronger proof to believe it than to believe in a higher power that raises the thought of the dead. The only difference that counts against the resurrection, the author writes, is that "the first miracle we have repeatedly seen, and the last miracle we have not seen." Even so, the author says, the resurrection of a spiritual body is far more probable than human immortality on earth, which has no sign or indication and contradicts one of the most constant laws of nature.

Beyond this life, the author says, we have only authority, conjecture and feeling as guides. On events on earth, analogy should still govern our expectations. Analogy allows much latitude: man will discover more laws of nature, but no analogy suggests a sixth sense or a new power of mind outside our observation. The author ends by observing that the subject has been treated at length only because Godwin offered appearances in support of his view, and those appearances deserve examination. The examination suggests that there is "rather less reason for supposing that the life of man may be indefinitely prolonged, than that trees may be made to grow indefinitely high, or potatoes indefinitely large."

The author turns to William Godwin's treatment of the objection from population and argues that Godwin errs by treating people too much as purely rational beings. Godwin, examining whether sound reasoning and truth can be communicated, sets out a proposition and then says, in the author's quoted words, "Such is the appearance which this proposition assumes, when examined in a loose and practical view." The author's reply is blunt. Calling this a strict consideration is wrong, and it is "the loosest, and most erroneous, way possible, of considering it." He compares it to calculating the fall of a body in a vacuum and insisting the result would hold through any medium. Newton, he says, did not philosophize that way.

Very few general propositions are just in application to a particular subject.

Predicting the motions of the moon and the earth required estimating the disturbing forces of the sun and of each body upon the other. Without those estimates, observations would have shown the theory to be inaccurate.

The author accepts that every voluntary act is preceded by a decision of the mind. But he argues it would contradict all experience to deny that bodily propensities act powerfully as disturbing forces in those decisions. So the question is not only whether a person can understand a proposition. As the author puts it,

a truth may be brought home to his conviction as a rational being, though he may determine to act contrary to it, as a compound being.

Hunger, the love of liquor, and the desire for a beautiful woman drive people to acts they know will harm society, even at the moment they commit them. Remove the cravings and they would decide otherwise. Judge the same conduct in another person and they would condemn it at once. The gap between the conviction of the reasoning mind and the decision of the whole human being, in the author's account, lies in the situation and the appetites.

If this is the right view, the author says, much of Godwin's reasoning about coercion in his seventh chapter rests on error. Godwin mocks the attempt to convince a man's understanding by blows. The author agrees that this is "ridiculous and barbarous, and so is cock-fighting," but he argues that beating has about as little to do with the real aims of punishment as cock-fighting does. He notes that death is one frequent, and much too frequent, mode of punishment. He doubts Godwin would think it aimed at conviction, since it is hard to see what benefit an understanding enlightened in that way could bring to the individual or to society.

The author names the principal objects of human punishment as restraint and example. Restraint means removing a member whose habits are likely to harm society. Example expresses the community's sense of a crime and ties crime and punishment together visibly, giving others a moral motive to stay away from it. Godwin accepts restraint as a temporary expedient but rejects solitary imprisonment. The author says solitary imprisonment has been the most successful, and nearly the only, attempt at the moral reform of offenders. He doubts that the virtues Godwin credits to society arise in a prison. He suggests an offender kept among able and virtuous men might improve more than in solitude, but asks whether that is practicable. His remark is that Godwin's ingenuity is more often spent finding evils than suggesting practical remedies. Godwin totally rejects punishment, and the author answers that "the abuse of any practice is not a good argument against its use." He points to the careful effort in England to find murderers and make sure they are punished. That effort, he argues, has helped produce the common belief that "a murder will sooner or later come to light," and so a man in the agony of passion may throw down his knife for fear of being tempted to use it. In Italy, where murderers who fled to a sanctuary were more often allowed to escape, the crime was held in less detestation and was more frequent. In the author's view, if every murder in Italy had been invariably punished, the use of the stiletto in moments of passion would be comparatively little known.

The author accepts that human laws cannot match punishment exactly to each offence, because motives cannot be known with certainty. He calls this a kind of injustice but not a sound argument against laws. People often have to choose between two evils, and an institution is justified if it is the best available way of preventing greater evils. Institutions should be made as perfect as their nature allows, but "nothing is so easy as to find fault with human institutions; nothing so difficult as to suggest adequate practical improvements." He laments that more men of talent spend their time on the first task than on the second.

Finally, the author observes that the frequency of crime among people who, as the saying goes, know better shows that a truth can be grasped by the mind without changing conduct. He also holds that some truths may never be fully communicated from one person to another. Godwin treats the superiority of intellectual pleasures to sensual ones as a fundamental truth. The author would largely agree, but asks how such a truth can be conveyed to someone who has scarcely ever felt intellectual pleasure. He likens it to explaining the nature and beauty of colours to a blind man. There is no common measure between the two, and the truth cannot be demonstrated. What can be offered is the agreement of the wisest and best people across the ages, and the author's own experience that sensual pleasures prove vain, transient, and tedious, while intellectual pleasures stay fresh and steady. A listener who accepts this on such grounds, the author says, is showing "credulity, and not conviction."

The affair is not an affair of reasoning, but of experience.

He imagines Godwin replying that a book sends him to sleep, while an evening with a gay party or a pretty woman leaves him feeling alive. Under such circumstances, the author concludes, argument is unlikely to work. Perhaps a later satiety with sensual pleasures, or some chance impression that wakes the mind, could accomplish in a month what patient argument could not in forty years.

The chapter tests the five propositions on which Godwin's work rests, starting with the corollaries he draws about political truth. Those corollaries are that "Sound reasoning and truth, when adequately communicated, must always be victorious over error", that "Truth is omnipotent", that "The vices and moral weakness of man are not invincible", and that

Man is perfectible, or in other words, susceptible of perpetual improvement.

The author treats the first three as a syllogism and shows that it depends on what "adequately communicated" means. If it means a conviction strong enough to change conduct, the major premise can be granted but the minor denied, and the omnipotence of truth falls away. If it means only that the reasoning faculty is persuaded, the major premise must be denied, and the minor holds only for matters that can be demonstrated. Either way the conclusion fails. The fourth proposition restates the one before it, so it falls with it.

The author then asks why we have reason to think that the vices and moral weakness of man can never be wholly overcome. Godwin holds that a man is formed by the impressions he receives from the moment he is animated. His work argues that most vices come from unjust political and social institutions, and that if those were removed and understandings enlightened, there would be little temptation to evil. The author says this is a false conception. Whatever the institutions, the greater part of mankind must be exposed to temptations arising from want and other passions, because of "the fixed and unalterable laws of nature". On Godwin's own account of how character is formed, such impressions and their combinations must produce a variety of bad men. The author illustrates this with dice. It is "as improbable that under such circumstances all men will be virtuous as that sixes will come up a hundred times following upon the dice." The many combinations across repeated throws stand for the many kinds of character, and the comparison shows that exceptions will not become general rules.

The author anticipates an objection. Godwin could reply that the causes behind the dice stay the same every throw, whereas people can shape the causes that form character, so that each virtuous person makes another virtuous person more likely. The author admits the comparison is not exact but holds that the objection is only partly valid. Repeated experience shows that the influence of the most virtuous character rarely prevails against very strong temptations. It affects some people but fails with many more. The author says he would give up the comparison if Godwin had shown that human effort could remove these temptations, or at least that a man could be so skilled at the mechanics of throwing that he always rolled sixes. But so long as many of the impressions that form character remain independent of the will of man, the author concludes that "it may be safely asserted that the vices and moral weakness of mankind, taken in the mass, are invincible." Predicting the exact future balance of virtue and vice would be folly, but that general claim can be made.

The fifth proposition is the general conclusion drawn from the four, so it falls with them, and perfectibility in Godwin's sense cannot be asserted. The author finds one sense in which the word does hold. Man is always open to improvement, and no period of history has brought him to his highest possible state. That does not mean that efforts to improve him will always succeed, or that he will make great strides in most ages. The only conclusion is that the limit of his improvement cannot be known. The author separates two ideas. One is unlimited improvement, which is "an improvement not applicable to man under the present laws of his nature". The other is improvement whose limit cannot be ascertained, which "undoubtedly, is applicable."

To show what real perfectibility looks like, the author returns to the plant. A florist seeking size, symmetry and beauty of colour in a carnation cannot claim to have reached the best possible flower. Nor can he be sure that stronger means will yield a finer bloom, because pushing one quality can damage another. A richer soil that enlarges the plant may burst the calyx and destroy its symmetry. The author applies this to society. The forcing manure used to bring about the French Revolution, meant to give greater freedom and energy to the human mind, has "burst the calyx of humanity, the restraining bond of all society". However large some petals have grown, the result is "a loose, deformed, disjointed mass, without union, symmetry, or harmony of colouring." Breeding flowers is a small matter, since a burst bloom is quickly replaced. An experiment on the human race is different. The breaking of society's bonds is a separation that gives acute pain to thousands, and a long time may pass before the wound heals.

The author concludes that the five propositions are the corner stones of Godwin's structure, so he has failed in his main aim, however good some of his particular reasoning is. The principal argument against the perfectibility of man and society is left whole. The author judges that this argument is conclusive not only against perfectibility in Godwin's broad sense but against any marked change for the better in the form of general society. By that he means any great and decided improvement in the condition of the lower classes, who are the most numerous and so the most important part of humankind. Even if he lived a thousand years with the laws of nature unchanged, he would expect no contradiction from experience in saying that no sacrifice by the rich in a long-settled country could for any length of time place the lower classes in circumstances equal to those of the common people in the northern States of America about thirty years earlier. The lower classes may be better instructed, may spend their spare time in better ways than at the ale-house, may live under better and more equal laws, and may even have more leisure. But "it is not in the nature of things" that they be given enough money or subsistence for all of them to marry early, confident of supporting a large family with ease.

Malthus begins with William Godwin, whose preface to his Enquirer drops a few expressions that seem to hint at a change in his opinions since the earlier Political Justice. Malthus is not sure that such a change has taken place, because in some of the Enquirer essays, he says, "Mr Godwin's peculiar mode of thinking appears in as striking a light as ever."

Malthus then takes up a common belief, that although no one can reach perfection in anything, it always helps to keep the most perfect models before our eyes. He grants that this sounds plausible but calls it "very far from being generally true." He doubts it even for a young painter, who may gain more from copying a picture whose outlines are strongly marked and whose method of laying on colour is easy to see than from copying a highly finished masterpiece. Where the model's perfection is of a different and superior kind from the one we should naturally work towards, the author argues, we will probably not advance at all and may even block the progress we would otherwise have made. He gives the example of a being that is free from hunger and sleep. Such a being is more perfect than man, but if man tried to copy it he would fail to advance and would "probably destroy the little intellect which he was endeavouring to improve."

Malthus says the society Godwin describes is as far from existing forms of society as a being that lives without food or sleep is from a man. Improving present society, on this view, brings us no closer to Godwin's picture, just as walking parallel to a line brings us no closer to it. The real question, he says, is whether taking such a society as our polar star, meaning our guide, will advance or hold back the improvement of the human species. Malthus believes that Godwin has answered this question against himself in his essay 'Avarice and Profusion' in the Enquirer.

To explain the problem, Malthus turns to Adam Smith, who observed that nations as well as individuals grow rich by parsimony and poor by profusion, so that every frugal man is a friend and every spendthrift an enemy to his country. Smith's reason was that what is saved from income is added to stock, and so supports productive labour rather than unproductive labour. Malthus calls this observation evidently just. Godwin's essay looks similar at first, but in Malthus's view it is entirely different. Godwin compares the miser with the man who spends his income, and treats the miser as a man who locks his wealth in a chest and sets no labour in motion at all. A miser of that kind does nothing for the prosperity of the state, unlike Smith's frugal man, who puts savings to work. Malthus says Godwin's conclusion therefore looks as false as Smith's is true. Godwin could see that the poor might suffer some immediate harm when funds meant for their labour were locked up, so he tried to weaken this objection by comparing the two characters mainly on how each would speed the approach of the state that he calls

happy state of cultivated equality, on which he says we ought always to fix our eyes as our polar star.

Malthus argues that such a society is impossible, as the earlier parts of his essay had shown. Looking to it as a guide, he says, can only bring "winds perpetually adverse, constant but fruitless toil, frequent shipwreck, and certain misery." Such efforts would waste strength, cause repeated distress through failure, and so hold back the improvement that is actually attainable.

He also argues that a society organised on Godwin's system would sink into a class of proprietors and a class of labourers. Substituting benevolence for self-love would not bring the happy results its fair name suggests. Instead, the pressure of want that now falls on only part of society would fall on the whole of it. Malthus points out that civilisation owes its finest achievements to the established administration of property and to what he calls the apparently narrow principle of self-love. Human nature has not yet changed enough, he says, for people to be sure that they "may safely throw down the ladder by which he has risen to this eminence."

For the labourer, labour is the only property he has. The only way a poor man can support himself independently is through his bodily strength, which is the only thing he has to offer in exchange for the necessities of life. Any measure that narrows the market for labour and lowers the value of that one possession therefore harms him.

Malthus adds a clarification. The main argument of his essay shows only that a class of proprietors and a class of labourers is necessary. It does not show that the present great inequality of property is necessary or useful. He regards that inequality as an evil, and any institution that promotes it as bad policy. Whether a government could properly act to reduce inequality of fortunes, however, he treats as an open question. He suggests that the generous system of perfect liberty favoured by Adam Smith and the French economists might be a poor trade for any system of restraint.

Godwin, Malthus says, might describe the whole system of barter and exchange as a vile traffic, and suggest that the rich should share the poor man's labour or give away their money without demanding a return. Malthus replies that the rich are few in number compared with the poor, so even a willing sharing of the burden would relieve the poor of only a small part of it. He grants that if all the workers of luxury were moved into producing necessities, and that work were shared fairly, each person's share might be light. But he says he cannot conceive of any practical principle by which such a fair division could happen. He argues that benevolence guided by the strict impartial justice Godwin describes would, if acted on vigorously, push the whole human race into want and misery. If the proprietor kept a decent share and gave the rest away without asking anything in return, the result would be idleness and vice, as well as a serious risk of reducing the produce of the land and the labour of luxury.

Malthus says Godwin seems to have little respect for practical principles. He himself thinks that someone who shows how an inferior good can be reached is "a much greater benefactor to mankind" than someone who merely dwells on the deformity of the present state of society and the beauty of another state, without naming a practical method for moving from one to the other.

From the principle of population, Malthus argues, more people will always be in want than can be supplied. A rich man's surplus might be enough for three, but four will want it. When he chooses three out of the four, he confers a great favour on them, and they become dependent on him for their support. The rich man feels his power, the poor man feels his dependence, and the effects of these two feelings on the human heart are well known. Malthus agrees with Godwin that hard labour is an evil, but he thinks dependence is a worse evil and more damaging to the mind. He writes that "every history of man that we have ever read" shows the danger faced by a mind that is entrusted with constant power.

By contrast, when labour is in demand, the man who works for an employer gives him as much as he receives. Each has what the other wants, and the exchange is fair. "The poor man walks erect in conscious independence," and the employer's mind is not corrupted by a sense of power.

Malthus also looks back in history. Three or four hundred years ago England had much less labour in proportion to its population, but far more dependence. He suggests that English civil liberty owes a good deal to the introduction of manufactures, which let the poor give something in return for the provisions of the great lords instead of relying on their charity. Even opponents of trade and manufacture, he says, must admit that "when they were introduced into England, liberty came in their train."

Malthus is careful to say that none of this undervalues benevolence, which he calls "one of the noblest and most godlike qualities of the human heart." He suggests it grew out of self-love and was meant to act as a general law that softens the harshness of its parent. Nature, he argues, seems to work this way: almost every general law seems to produce some partial evil, and some other general provision often corrects the inequality the first one causes.

His key point is this:

The proper office of benevolence is to soften the partial evils arising from self-love, but it can never be substituted in its place.

If no one acted until he had settled which action would best serve the general good, the wisest people would hesitate in confusion and the least enlightened would keep making serious mistakes.

Since Godwin has not set out any practical principle for sharing the necessary work of agriculture fairly among labourers, Malthus argues, his general attacks on employing the poor pursue what cannot be attained at the cost of much present evil. If every employer of the poor is their enemy and adds to their oppression, then the miser should be preferred to the man who spends his income. But if so, Malthus says, people who now spend their incomes might be turned into misers for society's benefit. Suppose a hundred thousand people who now employ ten men each were to lock up their wealth. Then a million working men of various kinds would be thrown out of work. Godwin himself, Malthus believes, could hardly deny the misery this would cause.

Godwin's reply is that the miser locks up nothing at all, and that the nature of wealth has not been properly understood. Defining wealth as the commodities that human labour produces and fosters, Godwin says the miser locks up no corn, oxen, clothes, or houses. Malthus grants that the miser does not literally lock these things up, but argues that he locks up "the power of producing them, which is virtually the same." Those goods are still used and consumed by his contemporaries, but not to the same extent as they would be if he had used his wealth to farm more land, breed more oxen, employ more tailors, and build more houses. Even if the miser's conduct did not hold back any useful production, Malthus asks, how would those who lost their work get a fair share of the food and clothing the society produces? He calls this "the unconquerable difficulty."

Malthus is willing to accept that there is far more labour in the world than is strictly necessary, and that if the working classes agreed never to work more than six or seven hours a day, the goods essential to human happiness could still be produced in as great abundance. But he thinks such an agreement could hardly be kept. People with large families would want to trade two more hours of labour for a larger supply of food, and it would be a violation of a person's most sacred property to stop him from doing so by positive institutions that interfere with his command over his own labour. Until Godwin can name a practical plan for dividing necessary labour fairly, Malthus argues, his attacks on labour would cause much present evil without bringing society nearer to the state of cultivated equality that he holds up as his polar star. Malthus adds that a mariner guided by such a star is in danger of shipwreck.

Malthus names one use of wealth that he thinks could hardly be more beneficial to the state, especially to the lower orders: improving land that would not pay a farmer to cultivate. If Godwin had used his eloquence to praise those who employ the poor in this way over those who employ them in narrow luxuries, Malthus says, every enlightened man would have applauded him. A growing demand for agricultural labour must always tend to improve the condition of the poor. Far from forcing workers to labour ten hours for the wage they now earn for eight, such work would let a labourer support his wife and family "as well by the labour of six hours as he could before by the labour of eight."

Labour created by luxuries, Malthus says, does distribute the produce of the country without giving the proprietor undue power or the labourer a condition of dependence. But it does not have the same good effect on the poor. Extra work from manufacturers may raise wages even more than extra demand for farm labour, but if the country's food supply does not rise in proportion, the gain is only temporary, because the price of provisions must rise along with wages.

Finally, Malthus says he wants to offer some remarks on a part of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, though he does so with the diffidence he feels in differing from a man so celebrated in the political world.

Adam Smith's inquiry is into the wealth of nations, but the writer says a second question runs through it: what makes the lives of the lower orders, the most numerous class in every nation, happier and more comfortable. Smith treats the two as closely linked, and generally they are. The writer's point is that Smith has not stopped to notice cases where a society's wealth can grow without doing anything for its labouring poor. The two measures used are health, and command over the necessaries and conveniences of life.

The basic mechanism is this. When the funds set aside for maintaining labour increase, employers compete for workers, wages rise, and labourers live more comfortably, at least until the additional workers have been born and the gain fades. The writer's objection is that not every increase in a nation's revenue or stock is such a fund. Surplus wealth counts as a real fund for supporting more workers only if "the whole, or at least a great part of this increase of the stock or revenue of the society, be convertible into a proportional quantity of provisions." If the growth comes from manufacturing rather than from land, that conversion fails. The writer separates the number of hands a society's stock could employ from the number its territory can actually feed.

He works through an example. Suppose a nation saves only into its manufacturing capital and nothing into its land. By Smith's own definition, which counts the "annual produce of its land and labour," that nation grows richer. Manufacturers would bid for more labour and wages would rise. But if the stock of food stays the same, the rise is only nominal, because the price of provisions must rise with it. Some workers would also leave farming, which the writer regards as unfavourable to health, and manufacturing work is exposed to the caprice of fashion and the accidents of war. He considers two replies and finds them weak. Capital might flow back into agriculture, but the rise in wages would come first and slow that. Food might be imported, but that works for a small country like Holland, with a large navy and good inland carriage, and not for large countries.

The writer then argues that England since the Revolution, meaning the settlement of 1688, comes close to this case. Its commerce has advanced rapidly over the last century, and the exchangeable value of its annual produce has risen considerably. But the increase has come chiefly from labour and not from land. So, in his words,

The increasing wealth of the nation has had little or no tendency to better the condition of the labouring poor.

He believes the poor have no greater command of necessaries than before, and that a much larger share of them now works in manufactures, crowded into close and unwholesome rooms.

Population is his test. He weighs the dispute between Dr Price, who held that England's population had fallen since the Revolution, and Mr Howlett, who disagreed. Price appears the better master of his subject, and the writer concludes that "Dr Price's point is nearer being proved than Mr Howlett's." Truth probably lies between the two, which still means population grew slowly while wealth grew fast. The general rule he draws is that if the funds for labour are increasing, the extra people will quickly appear. So a stationary or falling population signals that those funds have not grown.

On land, he doubts that output has fallen, but he notes that enclosure of common fields may have reduced it. Land turned to pasture feeds fewer people than corn land of the same fertility. Meat is dear today, he says, not because of scarcity but because fattening cattle costs more than it once did. A fattened beast, in the language of the French economists, is an unproductive labourer, since

he has added nothing to the value of the raw produce that he has consumed.

Grazing on the best land, and the many horses kept for pleasure, have held back the food supply. A change of custom would, he thinks, raise subsistence and with it population. He adds that the rise in the poor rates is strong evidence the poor are not better off. Shifts in fashion, such as muslins replacing silks, have thrown thousands on charity, and corporation and parish laws restrain the labour market.

Finally he turns to China. Smith suggested that China, if foreign trade were honoured, might grow much richer. The writer argues that a large export trade in manufactures would pull labour out of agriculture, raise wages in name only, and reduce the country's food output. Labour in China is so plentiful that no effort is spent saving it, and that is why the land produces as much as it can. Wealth would rise by Smith's definition, but the poor would gain nothing. The general lesson follows: two nations could grow equally fast in the exchangeable value of their produce, yet differ sharply.

In that which had applied itself chiefly to agriculture, the poor would live in great plenty, and population would rapidly increase. In that which had applied itself chiefly to commerce, the poor would be comparatively but little benefited and consequently population would increase slowly.

The chapter opens with a question about what wealth really is. Malthus asks whether "the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour" is the right definition of a country's wealth, or whether the gross produce of the land, as the French economists define it, might be more accurate. Exchangeable value means the market price of everything a nation produces in a year. The distinction matters because, on the French definition, any growth in wealth adds to the funds that pay for labour and so tends to lift the working poor. On Adam Smith's definition, the author says, growth in wealth does not always have that effect.

The author does not simply reject Smith. He writes that

It seems in many respects improper to exclude the clothing and lodging of a whole people from any part of their revenue.

His only quarrel with Smith is with the assumption that every increase in a society's revenue automatically helps the poor. Luxury goods show the gap. In the author's words,

The fine silks and cottons, the laces, and other ornamental luxuries of a rich country, may contribute very considerably to augment the exchangeable value of its annual produce; yet they contribute but in a very small degree to augment the mass of happiness in the society.

So, he argues, the productiveness of different kinds of labour should be judged by the real usefulness of what they produce.

On manufacturing, the French economists call all labour in factories unproductive. The author agrees with the conclusion but not with their reasoning. They say farm labour is productive because the crop pays the labourer and the farmer and still leaves a clear rent for the landlord, while lace-making merely replaces the food the worker and his employer used up. Malthus answers that even if a lace-maker's work did pay a rent to a third person, it would still be unproductive compared with farming. The lace-maker may sell his lace for three times the food he consumed, and so be productive for himself, but he has added nothing essential to the riches of the state.

To make the point concrete, the author imagines two hundred thousand men now making goods that only feed the vanity of a few rich people. Suppose they were sent to barren land to grow only half the food they eat. They would still be more valuable to the state, because, as he puts it,

In their latter employment they consumed the same quantity of food and left in return provision for a hundred thousand men.

Most readers would agree that the wealth which supports those men is better spent on growing food.

The author then draws a distinction between returns to the individual and returns to society.

A capital employed upon land may be unproductive to the individual that employs it and yet be highly productive to the society. A capital employed in trade, on the contrary, may be highly productive to the individual, and yet be almost totally unproductive to the society.

He concedes that merchants often grow rich and live generously, even though the economists say manufacturers can only prosper by going without. His summary is that

Daily experience proves that the labour employed in trade and manufactures is sufficiently productive to individuals, but it certainly is not productive in the same degree to the state.

Food, he says, benefits the whole society at once, while trade profits reach the public only in a remote and uncertain way.

He also treats the home trade as the foundation of national wealth.

The home trade of consumption is by far the most important trade of every nation.

As his example he points to China, which he describes as "the richest country in the world, without any other." Foreign commerce, by Smith's definition, does add to a nation's wealth. But its main value, the author says, is that it increases a nation's external power and its ability to command the labour of other countries. It adds little to the internal funds that support labour, and so little to the happiness of most people.

Next comes a claim about the history of Europe. In a healthy progression, manufactures and foreign trade would follow the high cultivation of the soil. Europe, he says, has reversed this.

In Europe, this natural order of things has been inverted, and the soil has been cultivated from the redundancy of manufacturing capital, instead of manufactures rising from the redundancy of capital employed upon land.

He blames high wages in the towns relative to farm wages, and inheritance customs.

While from the law of primogeniture, and other European customs, land bears a monopoly price, a capital can never be employed in it with much advantage to the individual.

Primogeniture is the rule that the eldest son inherits the family estate, and a monopoly price is one set high because few can buy the land. The result, he argues, is that much of Europe's soil stays uncultivated. He adds that a wider distribution of property would help, since

The greater the number of proprietors, the smaller must be the number of labourers.

The author then turns to Dr Price's two volumes of Observations, which he calls an extraordinary source. Price had argued that great cities are the graves of mankind, and that diseases are "in general our own creation." He imagined a country where people living naturally and virtuously would die "like a sleep, in consequence of no other cause than gradual and unavoidable decay." Malthus says Price's facts pointed him to the opposite conclusion. He had long suspected that population and food grow at different rates, and that only some form of misery or vice could keep them balanced. Reading Price turned that suspicion into conviction. He finds it astonishing that Price could miss the point, since Price was a strong advocate of early marriage and wanted the "prolifick powers of nature" to have room to act. The author says this failure of understanding is "as astonishing as if he had resisted the conclusion of one of the plainest propositions of Euclid."

Price had also praised the simpler stages of civilization, saying "The first, or simple stages of civilization, are those which favour most the increase and the happiness of mankind." He cited the American colonies as the clearest example. Malthus argues that American happiness depended far more on the colonies' situation than on their level of civilization. They were new settlements with plenty of fertile, uncultivated land. Two or three centuries earlier, parts of Northern Europe had a similar level of civilization but not the same happiness or population growth. Price himself quotes a statute of Henry the Eighth complaining of decayed tillage and high food prices, whereby "a marvellous number of people were rendered incapable of maintaining themselves and families." Civil liberty helped America, the author grants, but "even civil liberty, all powerful as it is, will not create fresh land." He describes the situation of well-governed new colonies as "a bloom of youth that no efforts can arrest." Europe, by favouring its towns over its countryside, has in his view "brought on a premature old age."

The chapter ends on a grim note. The author writes that

The perpetual tendency in the race of man to increase beyond the means of subsistence is one of the general laws of animated nature which we can have no reason to expect will change.

Even the best-directed efforts, he admits, "though they may alleviate, can never remove the pressure of want." Still, he insists that hiding the problem does no good. "The most baleful mischiefs may be expected from the unmanly conduct of not daring to face truth because it is unpleasing." Enough progress remains possible to motivate people. But if reformers misjudge the difficulties, he warns, they will waste their strength on hopeless goals and be "perpetually crushed by the recoil of this rock of Sisyphus." In the Greek myth, Sisyphus is condemned to roll a boulder up a hill forever, only to watch it roll back down.

The chapter turns from the bleak arithmetic of population to a different view of human life. Malthus says that the constant pressure of distress from the difficulty of subsistence seems to point human hopes toward a future state, and that the world is often described as a state of trial and a school of virtue preparing people for something better. He proposes instead to view the world in another light, one he thinks fits the phenomena of nature better and sits more comfortably with our ideas of the power, goodness, and foreknowledge of God.

He is careful about how far human reason can go. He writes that it is an improving exercise to try to "vindicate the ways of God to man", provided we keep a proper distrust of our own understandings. His method is to reason from nature up to nature's God, and not to presume to reason from God to nature. Once we start asking why things are not otherwise, he argues, we lose any firm footing and the study ceases to be an improving exercise.

He contrasts two ways of imagining divine power. In vain fancies, God might have created countless beings, all free from pain and imperfection. But when we look at the book of nature, he says, we see a constant succession of sentient beings rising from specks of matter, passing through a long and sometimes painful process, and many attaining high qualities and powers that seem to fit them for a superior state. From this he argues that we should correct our crude ideas of infinite power by what we actually see, and that a certain process, and a certain time, may be necessary even for the Creator to form beings with exalted minds. He puts the point as a choice: unless we wish to exalt God's power at the expense of his goodness, we should accept that such a process is needed.

He then argues that the notion of a state of trial implies a previously formed existence, which does not fit the appearance of man in infancy and suggests suspicion and a lack of foreknowledge. He would instead regard the world and this life as a mighty process of God, not for trial, but for the creation and formation of mind. In his phrasing, the process awakens inert, chaotic matter into spirit, turns the dust of the earth into soul, and draws an ethereal spark from the clod of clay. The impressions and excitements that people receive through life are, on this view, the forming hand of the Creator acting through general laws. He calls the original sin of man the torpor and corruption of the chaotic matter in which he is born.

Malthus sets aside whether mind is a distinct substance from matter or only a finer form of it, calling that question perhaps merely one of words. He notes that soul and body are closely united and seem to grow together from infancy, and he judges it improbable that a fully formed spirit exists in each infant and is merely hindered by weak organs for the first twenty years. If God creates mind as well as body, and both unfold together, he argues, it is consistent with reason and revelation to suppose that God is constantly forming mind out of matter through the impressions people receive. He adds that this view gains probability if the events of life seem calculated to promote this end, and if it can account, even to our narrow understandings, for the roughnesses and inequalities that people often complain about.

He says the first great awakeners of the mind are the wants of the body. He admits he had meant to treat this at length as a second part of the Essay, but a long interruption from particular business has made him give only a sketch of a few leading circumstances. The wants of hunger and cold rouse the infant into activity, and the savage would slumber under his tree without them. The effort to satisfy these wants forms and keeps in motion faculties that would otherwise sink into listless inactivity. If those stimulants were removed from the mass of mankind, he argues, people would be more likely to sink to the level of brutes than to be raised to philosophy by leisure. He notes that in countries where nature is most generous, the inhabitants are not the most remarkable for acuteness of intellect, and he repeats the saying that necessity is the mother of invention. He writes that want has given wings to the imagination of the poet, pointed the periods of the historian, and sharpened the researches of the philosopher. He grants that some minds are so improved by knowledge or social sympathy that they would not relapse without bodily stimulants, but he still doubts these stimulants could be withdrawn from the mass without a general and fatal torpor.

He invokes Locke, who held that the avoidance of pain, rather than the pursuit of pleasure, is the great stimulus to action, and that we are roused to pursue a pleasure only once its absence has become a sensation of uneasiness. Malthus takes it that the great duty of man is to avoid evil and pursue good, and that this world is peculiarly suited to offering opportunity for that unremitting exertion, by which mind is formed. If Locke is right, as Malthus thinks there is good reason to believe, then evil seems necessary to create exertion, and exertion necessary to create mind.

He argues that the need for food gives rise to more exertion than any other want. God has ordained that the earth shall not yield good in great quantities until much preparatory labour and ingenuity have been applied to its surface. Malthus observes that we cannot grasp any connection between the seed and the plant that rises from it. The Creator could in principle raise plants without seed or human labour, but ploughing, clearing, collecting and sowing are made necessary in order to rouse man into action and form his reason.

To supply these constant excitements and urge man to cultivate the earth fully, he says, population has been ordained to increase faster than food. He concedes that this general law produces much partial evil, but argues that reflection shows it produces a great overbalance of good. Strong excitements create exertion, and the faculty of reason depends on the constancy of general laws, since we can expect the same effects from the same causes. If God frequently changed his purpose, or made his finger visible in the ordinary course of things, a general torpor of the faculties would probably follow, because people could no longer expect their efforts to be rewarded. He names the husbandman, the artificer, the physician, the anatomist and the natural philosopher as those whose industry and foresight rest on this constancy, and he says that the immortal mind of Newton is owed to it.

Returning to the principle of population, he describes man as inert, sluggish and averse from labour unless compelled by necessity. He concludes that the world would not have been peopled without the power of population exceeding the means of subsistence. He observes that even under this constant stimulus cultivation proceeds slowly, and that savages may live for long periods in very fertile countries before turning to pasturage or agriculture. Had population and food increased in the same ratio, he suggests, mankind might never have left the savage state. Once the earth is well peopled, however, a conqueror, a revolution, a contagious disorder or an earthquake might thin the human race for ages, and the principle of population restores numbers and keeps the inhabitants always up to the level of subsistence. He admits this law cannot operate as intended without occasioning partial evil. Because the principle could not be altered for each country without contradicting the universality of natural law, the same principle that will people a fertile region in a few years must produce distress in long-inhabited countries.

He judges that these difficulties tend to promote rather than impede the purpose of Providence, because they excite universal exertion and produce the variety of situations that favours the growth of mind. Too great or too little excitement, extreme poverty, or great riches may all be unfavourable. He says the middle regions of society seem best suited to intellectual improvement, but that the whole of society cannot be a middle region, just as all of the earth cannot be temperate. A world lit by one sun must have some parts chilled and others scorched, and every piece of matter has an upper and under side.

He illustrates the point with the oak. Its most valuable part to a timber merchant is the stem, yet the roots and branches are necessary to it. If a grower could make more of the substance go to the stem, the merchant would be right to adopt that method. In the same way, riches and poverty cannot be excluded from society, but if a form of government could lessen the numbers at the extremes and increase those in the middle, it would be our duty to adopt it. He adds that, as with the oak, the extremes cannot be reduced far without weakening the circulation of exertion through the middle parts. If no one could hope to rise or fear to fall, industry would not bring its reward, and the middle parts would not be what they are.

He holds that we should consider chiefly the mass of mankind rather than individual cases. Some minds are vivified early and need no narrow motives, but he believes that the useful discoveries and laudable exertions of mankind are more to be credited to the narrow motives that act on the many than to the enlarged motives that act on the few. Leisure is valuable, he says, but for man as he is it will more often produce evil than good. He notes the remark that talents are more common among younger brothers than elder brothers, and argues that the difference cannot come from a greater original capacity, only from circumstance: exertion is necessary for the one and optional for the other.

Finally, he says that the difficulties of life contribute to generating talent, as everyday experience shows. The efforts people must make to support themselves and their families awaken faculties that might otherwise have lain dormant, and new and extraordinary situations are commonly seen to create minds equal to the difficulties they face.

The author turns next to the sorrows and distresses of life, which he treats as a class of excitements in their own right. In his account they "form another class of excitements, which seem to be necessary, by a peculiar train of impressions, to soften and humanize the heart, to awaken social sympathy, to generate all the Christian virtues, and to afford scope for the ample exertion of benevolence." He puts the point bluntly:

The general tendency of an uniform course of prosperity is rather to degrade than exalt the character.

His reasoning is that a person who has never known sorrow will seldom feel for the pains and wishes of others.

The essay then separates talent from character. Talents are a prominent feature of mind, but they are not the whole of it. Many people who lack the particular powers that make talents have nonetheless been stirred to a high degree by social sympathy. The author finds such characters "in every rank of life, in the lowest as frequently as in the highest," and argues that a soul marked by charity, meekness and piety "seems to hold a nearer commerce with the skies than mere acuteness of intellect." He adds that the greatest talents have often been misapplied and have done evil in proportion to their power, though such minds still served a purpose by provoking the disgust and abhorrence of others.

From there the argument moves to a claim about moral evil. The author writes that

it seems highly probable that moral evil is absolutely necessary to the production of moral excellence.

His reason is that a being who sees only good is, in his phrase, "impelled by a blind necessity," so that its choice of good shows nothing about its virtue. He answers the objection that an all-knowing Creator could simply foresee how a being would choose. That argument might work against a state of trial, he says, but not against the idea that the mind in this world is still being formed. He uses the image of clay: a being that has met evil and felt disapproval is "essentially different" from one that has seen only good, because they are "pieces of clay that have received distinct impressions." Ardent love of virtue, he argues, seems to presuppose something opposed to it.

The essay then turns to intellectual wants, which arise once bodily wants have awakened the mind. Nature supplies them through its variety. The author borrows Shakespeare, who wrote that "Custom cannot stale her infinite variety," and says the line is literally true of nature. He adds that

Uniform, undiversified perfection could not possess the same awakening powers.

Imperfections, and the darkness around metaphysical questions, have a purpose too. Man will never fully satisfy these questions, the author says, yet the darkness "may be intended to furnish endless motives to intellectual activity and exertion," and the effort to dispel it improves the thinking faculty.

The author disputes the saying from Solomon that "there is no new thing under the sun." Knowledge may keep growing, he writes, but it is doubtful whether the capacity of the mind is growing with it. He points to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, who were less learned than modern thinkers but were not much their inferiors in intellect. The finest minds, in his view, are formed less by absorbing other people's ideas than by "efforts at original thinking." Suppose no new discoveries remained and the mind's only task were to learn what was already known. Then, he argues, "one of the noblest stimulants to mental exertion would have ceased," and no one would match the intellectual energy of a Locke, a Newton or a Shakespeare.

A revelation that removed every doubt about metaphysical questions would do the same damage, the author argues. Such an overwhelming increase in knowledge would "in all probability tend to repress future exertion and to damp the soaring wings of intellect." For this reason he does not treat the doubts and difficulties in the scriptures as proof against their divine origin. He also argues that a certainty of eternal punishment, held as firmly as the belief that night follows day, would "act like the touch of a torpedo on all intellectual exertion," a reference to the electric ray, whose shock numbs its prey. Conduct would then tell us nothing about the disposition behind it. The author holds that genuine Christian faith is better described as "operated upon more by love than by pure unmixed fear."

The essay rejects the idea that the creatures God forms imperfectly could be condemned to eternal suffering. It sets the New Testament's contrast of life and death against the contrast of happiness and misery, and reads the former as the more fitting frame. The author writes that "Life is, generally speaking, a blessing independent of a future state," and that the pain God inflicts in forming beings for higher happiness "is but as the dust of the balance in comparison of the happiness that is communicated." He finds that general laws must govern the formation of intellect, and that the rare exceptions, such as revelation, were meant to act on many people over many ages. Once the miracles had drawn attention, he argues, the doctrine was left to win people over by its own worth, as a moral motive rather than a force that overpowers the faculties. He concludes that the evidence the scriptures offer is "best suited to the improvement of the human faculties and the moral amelioration of mankind."

The chapter ends by tying this account of mind to the principle of population. The author says that the impressions of this world, and the effort they demand, explain much of natural and moral evil, and a large share of the evil that comes from population. Evil would not be removed, he admits, but its weight must shift with human activity or indolence, so that a constant hope of throwing it off remains. He quotes Pope's line that

Hope springs eternal in the Human breast.

His conclusion is that

Evil exists in the world not to create despair but activity.

The duty of each person is to strive against evil in themselves and in the circle they can influence, and the author holds that doing so improves the mind and fulfils the purpose of the Creator.

The main takeaway is that the author sees a pressure of population against food as a general law of nature, one that makes some degree of misery and vice a standing feature of human life. On that view, the hope that society can be made perfect, free of want and of the sexual passion, rests on conjecture rather than evidence. The essay still finds value in human exertion and in the hardships that call it forth, and it argues for institutions that reward industry and foresight rather than ones that relieve dependence.

The essay names its own limits. It concedes that a larger body of facts would have strengthened its case, that the positive check is hard to measure, and that its figures for particular countries are rough. It leaves open whether a government could properly act to reduce the great inequality of fortunes, and it allows that breeding might improve some bodily qualities, though it doubts this would ever become general. It also says plainly that it would withdraw its opinions if abler men could show that the central difficulty can be removed, even in theory.

  1. An Essay on the Principle of Population