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marginal revolution read out: The Economics of Rent Controls

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This episode of marginal revolution read out covers the post The Economics of Rent Controls. The post centers on a conversation between the author and Ryan Bourne on Bourne's podcast, The Economics of It, drawing on the author's essay Rent Control: The Ceiling Trap. The author calls it a very good discussion, and the post includes an edited excerpt from that conversation.

The first linked item is the post itself, The Economics of Rent Controls. It frames the whole discussion: the author appears on Ryan Bourne's excellent new podcast, The Economics of It, and they discuss the economics of rent controls, drawing on the author's essay Rent Control: The Ceiling Trap. The post then gives a transcript excerpt in which Bourne asks about the truly insane ways people try to signal to landlords that they will be good tenants in Oslo. The author explains that Oslo had rent controls for many years, then removed them in 1982. A paper by Are Oust looked at what happened. Under rent controls, renters advertised that they needed an apartment, and as part of their advertisements they would say they were willing to look after a cat or shovel snow. Landlords, on the other side, would say they were looking for a good Christian, or a heterosexual single-family couple, sometimes literally advertised and sometimes happening under the table. There were also demands like paying months or sometimes years of rent in advance. Even companies would say they had a great employee and ask someone to get that employee an apartment. Then, in 1982, rent controls were lifted, and the advertisements switched completely. Suddenly landlords were advertising great apartments, and all the offers to shovel driveways or take care of cats went away.

The second link is The Economics of It, the YouTube playlist for Ryan Bourne's podcast. The author's commentary is the same framing: he appears on Bourne's excellent new podcast, they discuss the economics of rent controls drawing on the essay Rent Control: The Ceiling Trap, and it is a very good discussion. The fetched page is just the YouTube playlist page, so the substance here is the podcast series itself, which is the venue for the conversation.

The third link is The Economics of Rent Controls, the specific YouTube video of the discussion. Again the author's commentary is the same: the appearance on Bourne's podcast, the discussion of rent controls, the essay as the basis, and the assessment that it is a very good discussion. The fetched page is the YouTube page for the video, so the link points to the actual conversation rather than adding new written content.

The fourth link is Rent Control: The Ceiling Trap, the author's essay. This is the substantive written piece behind the podcast. The essay opens by calling rent control the most tempting idea in economics. Rising rents make a legal cap feel immediate and humane, and in every expensive city the same conversation repeats. A family gets a renewal notice that makes their stomach drop, and someone proposes the obvious remedy: make it illegal, cap the rent, freeze it. The appeal is real, and so is the problem it responds to. In big productive cities, a third or more of renter households spend over thirty percent of income on housing, the standard threshold for being rent burdened. Rent control promises relief, and it delivers something voters can feel immediately: my rent stops rising, starting now. Yet among economists, rent control has achieved near-consensus in a field famous for disagreement. In a 1992 survey, 93 percent of American economists agreed that rent ceilings reduce the quantity and quality of housing available. When the IGM panel of elite economists was asked in 2012 whether rent control had improved affordable housing in New York and San Francisco over the prior three decades, 2 percent agreed. The essay says it is about the gap between the voter's intuition and the economist's intuition. It is not a story about greedy landlords versus deserving tenants. It is a story about what a price is, what happens when you silence one, and what a hundred years of natural experiments have revealed about cities that tried.

The essay then develops the core idea that a price is a signal. Rent control does not repeal scarcity; it just deletes the signal that manages it. A rent is a message flashed between strangers. To renters it says housing here is scarce, so economize on it, share it, or consider the next neighborhood over. To builders and landlords it says people desperately want to live here, so build, convert, renovate, rent out the basement. High rents are how a city calls for more housing, the way a fever calls for antibodies. The essay cites the author's own textbook with Tyler Cowen, Modern Principles of Economics, for the idea that a price is a signal wrapped up in an incentive. A price ceiling does not make housing cheaper any more than smashing a thermometer makes a fever go down. It makes the signal illegal while leaving the scarcity untouched, and then the scarcity finds other, crueler ways to express itself. Below the market rent, renters demand more housing, and owners supply less. The gap between those two curves is the shortage. The essay notes two subtleties that make rent control especially seductive and especially damaging. First, housing is durable. Buildings do not vanish the day a ceiling passes; they erode over decades of skipped paint jobs, cancelled projects, and quiet conversions. The costs arrive on a lag, long after the politicians who passed the law have taken their bows. Second, the beneficiaries are visible and the victims are hypothetical. The tenant whose rent is frozen knows it. The family that never moved to the city because no apartment was listed does not even know it was the victim of a policy. Economic theory predicts a ceiling held below market rent will produce five things: shortages, quality decay, wasteful search, lost gains from trade, and misallocation.

The essay then checks those predictions against evidence. It begins with San Francisco, where the 1906 earthquake and fire destroyed 3,400 acres and left more than half the city homeless. The survivors' housing stock had to absorb, on average, 40 percent more people per remaining home. Yet the first issue of the San Francisco Chronicle after the disaster showed no housing crisis. The classifieds carried 64 advertisements offering flats and houses for rent, against 5 ads from people seeking one. Forty years later, in 1946, San Francisco faced a far milder squeeze, about 10 percent more people per dwelling than before the war. This time the governor called housing the most critical problem facing California. In the first five days of 1946 the classifieds carried 4 ads offering apartments for rent and 30 ads a day from people begging for one. The difference was not scarcity; 1906 was vastly worse. The difference was the rationing mechanism. In 1906, higher rents did the rationing. In 1946, raising rents was illegal, and rationing was by chance and favoritism.

The essay then turns to quality, using Mumbai as the example. In 1947, Bombay froze rents at roughly their 1940 levels. The freeze was temporary, and then it was extended for more than half a century. In the heart of one of the most expensive property markets on Earth, tenants in grand old buildings still pay a few dollars a month, protected by law, passing tenancies down through generations. The law could freeze the rent, but it could not freeze the buildings. A landlord collecting 1940 rent in a 2020 economy cannot pay for waterproofing, rebar, or repairs, and has no reason to try, since a queue of tenants waits regardless. So the buildings age, sag, and crumble. Mumbai keeps an official register of dilapidated structures, and the island city's stock of cessed buildings, over 14,000 of them, nearly all rent-controlled, is so hazardous that the state levies a special tax to fund a public board whose job is repairing private buildings their owners long ago abandoned to entropy. Every monsoon season, some of them come down, and people die in the rubble. The essay quotes the claim that in many cases rent control appears to be the most efficient technique presently known to destroy a city, except for bombing. The empirical literature backs the war metaphors: of the dozens of published studies on rent control and housing quality, all but two find that controlled housing deteriorates. Quality is the escape valve. If a landlord cannot raise the rent to the market level, he can let the apartment fall to the rent's level instead.

The essay then examines the queue, the key, and the babysitting clause. Stockholm is a beautiful, orderly city with a beautiful, orderly catastrophe at its center. Rents on first-hand contracts are held far below market by negotiated utility value rules, so almost no one gives an apartment up, and getting one means joining the municipal housing queue. Not a metaphorical queue: a literal one, with a number. Nearly one million people are registered, and the average wait for a contract runs about nine years. For an attractive address in the inner city, expect twenty. A rent ceiling does not lower the cost of housing; it converts the cost into waiting time, a currency that, unlike rent, is destroyed rather than transferred. Nobody receives the years you spend in a queue. Oslo ran the experiment in reverse. Norway abolished its rent control in 1982, and the economist Are Oust realized the newspapers had been quietly recording the whole experiment. He collected housing classifieds from Oslo's Aftenposten from 1970 to 2008 and watched the market turn inside out. Under rent control, Oslo's listings pages looked nothing like a housing market. It was tenants who advertised, pleading their qualities to landlords. Ten to fifteen percent of those ads were placed by the tenant's employer, vouching for them the way a bank vouches for a borrower. Tenants offered babysitting, gardening, snow-shoveling, and janitorial work on the side to sweeten the deal. Landlords could demand a tenant of a particular gender, age, occupation, or region of origin, and some ads specified strong Christian beliefs. Deposits commonly ran to 50 or 60 months' rent, occasionally 100 or more. Only about 20 percent of for-rent ads dared print the rent, much of which would have been illegal. Then the ceiling lifted. Within a few years the page flipped: landlords advertised to tenants, roughly 80 percent of listings printed an asking rent, the mega-deposits vanished, and the demands for snow-shoveling Christians of specified gender dwindled to nothing. The price went back to doing the rationing, so nothing else had to. This is the answer to chance and favoritism. Under a binding ceiling the apartment goes not to the family that needs it most, but to the applicant with the right employer, the right connections, the right demographic profile, the cash for key money, or simply the luck to already be inside. Economists call these search costs, and they are the cruelest part of the bargain: rent paid to a landlord is at least a transfer that keeps housing supplied. Years in a queue, favors, and discrimination benefit no one at all.

The essay then turns to misallocation, under the heading musical chairs with no music. Rent control decides who gets housing by one rule: never move. Picture a widow in a rent-controlled classic six on the Upper West Side. Her children are grown and gone, and the second and third bedrooms hold boxes. Three subway stops away, a family of five squeezes into a one-bedroom. In a normal market this problem solves itself. Under rent control, swapping is financial suicide, because her rent is a relic of 1985, and the moment she moves she loses it forever. So the boxes keep the bedrooms, the family keeps the crowding, and the law congratulates itself on protecting them both. Ed Glaeser and Erzo Luttmer put a number on this. Comparing who lives in what across New York City, they estimated that 21 percent of rent-controlled apartments were occupied by the wrong household, wrong at least in size, singles in family flats and families in studios, relative to how an unregulated market would sort them. The lock-in shows up everywhere researchers look. In Copenhagen, tenants in the most tightly controlled units stay dramatically longer than comparable tenants in freer segments. In the 112-study literature, the effect of rent control on tenant mobility is one of the most consistent findings in all of housing economics: nearly every study finds it falls. That is partly the policy working, because stability is the point, and partly the policy failing, because a city where no one can afford to move is a city where workers cannot follow jobs, growing families cannot find space, and every apartment is a lottery ticket its holder dares not cash. Misallocation also has a distributional sting: the winners of the never-move lottery are not especially poor. Rent control is almost never means-tested. New York's stabilized apartments have sheltered celebrities and congressmen.

The essay then begins a section on the verdict from the field, noting that modern economics runs on natural experiments, and rent control has provided some beauties. The cleanest evidence comes from an accident of ballot design in San Francisco. The 1979 rent control law exempted small buildings, mom and pop landlords, until the fetched text cuts off there.

The fifth and final link is the great paper by Are Oust, the academic article titled The removal of rent control and its impact on search and mismatching costs: evidence from Oslo. The fetch failed, so the article's full text is not available. But the author's commentary in the post gives the key finding: in Oslo, when rent controls were in place, renters advertised that they needed an apartment, and as part of their advertisements they would say they were willing to look after a cat or shovel snow. Landlords would say they were looking for a good Christian or a heterosexual single-family couple, sometimes literally advertised and sometimes under the table. There were also demands like paying months or years of rent in advance. Even companies would say they had a great employee and ask someone to get that employee an apartment. Then in 1982 the rent controls were lifted, and the advertisements switched completely. Suddenly landlords were advertising great apartments, and all the offers to shovel driveways or take care of cats went away. The title itself signals the paper's focus: the removal of rent control and its impact on search and mismatching costs, using Oslo as the natural experiment.

Across the post, the theme is consistent: rent control is one of the most tempting ideas in economics, but the evidence from natural experiments, from San Francisco to Mumbai to Stockholm to Oslo, shows that when you silence the price signal, scarcity expresses itself in other ways: queues, discrimination, quality decay, and misallocation. The author's conversation with Ryan Bourne brings that evidence to a podcast audience, and the essay lays it out in full.

  1. The Economics of Rent Controls
  2. The Economics of It
  3. The Economics of Rent Controls
  4. Rent Control: The Ceiling Trap
  5. great paper by Are Oust