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This episode of marginal revolution read out covers the post End the State Veto on Power Lines. The author opens by noting a peculiarity of American regulatory history. A natural gas pipeline can cross state lines with a single federal permit, but oil and electricity must run a gauntlet of state approvals. When a power line crosses one state to reach another, the intervening state often imposes exorbitant tolls or, worse, vetoes the project entirely. The author calls this the holdout problem played out among the states. That opening sets up the central question of the post: whether electricity transmission should get the same federal treatment that natural gas pipelines already have. The post also includes a chart comparing interstate gas pipeline mileage before and after the 1947 amendment, making the jump visually obvious.
The next linked article is titled new paper. It is a working paper by Zachary Liscow, Joseph Shapiro, and Heidi Williams, published in November 2026. The author's commentary highlights the central finding. After Congress ended the states' veto over interstate gas pipelines in 1947, miles built per year rose nearly sixfold. Oil pipelines, which still had to run the state gauntlet, held steady. The author says lower transaction costs let natural gas flow to where it was most valued, creating a national market. The magnitude is the key point: a nearly sixfold increase is not a marginal improvement; it is a structural change.
The paper itself is titled Federal Eminent Domain and Interstate Energy Infrastructure: Evidence from History. It analyzes a historical episode to estimate how federal eminent domain authority affected the construction of energy transportation infrastructure. The 1947 amendment to the Natural Gas Act gave federally approved interstate natural gas pipelines the power to acquire rights of way by eminent domain when negotiations with landowners failed. The researchers compare construction of interstate gas pipelines with construction of oil pipelines and within-state gas pipelines, neither of which was directly affected by the reform. They use newly digitized historical government records and trade press listings. After 1947, annual additions to interstate gas pipeline mileage rose nearly sixfold while oil pipeline growth held steady. The gain in interstate mileage was nearly five times the gain for within-state pipelines. The authors conclude that the amendment substantially increased interstate gas pipeline construction. They also argue that this historical evidence is directly relevant to current congressional proposals to provide federal eminent domain authority for interstate electricity transmission.
The final linked article is Washington Post. The article text could not be retrieved for this episode, so the treatment here follows the author's commentary and the title. The author says that in the Washington Post, Liscow and Shapiro turn from gas to electricity. The issue is that an interstate power line typically needs approval from every state it crosses. That gives each state a veto over projects in which the benefits often flow mostly to its neighbors. The author relays the consequences from New England. In 2016, Massachusetts attempted to import Canadian hydropower. New Hampshire, which would have hosted the power lines without getting the same influx of cheap energy, rejected the project. A second route through Maine was blocked in a referendum and did not deliver power until January. Meanwhile, Massachusetts households paid some of the highest electricity prices in the country. The example shows a recurring feature of interstate infrastructure: the beneficiaries and the burdened parties are often not the same states.
The author's conclusion ties the examples together. Just as natural gas is cheapest to produce far from where it is most valued, electricity is often cheapest to produce far from where it is most valued. To get the most from national resources, electricity needs to be transmitted across the country. The author notes that the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, which faces a Senate cloture vote on Monday, would let FERC approve an interstate line that a state has blocked or stalled for a year. The author describes this as a big step toward a national market in electricity and closes with the call: let the power flow. That is why the author sees federal backstop authority as more than a technical fix.
Taken together, the post argues that the same federal logic that worked for gas pipelines after 1947 should be applied to power lines today. The historical evidence is not merely an analogy; it is a direct comparison showing what happens when state vetoes are removed. The proposed bill would move electricity transmission closer to the national market model that natural gas already enjoys, and the New England example shows the costs of leaving the current holdout problem in place.
