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marginal revolution read out: The economics of honeypots

marginal revolution read out ·

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Source: https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2026/11/the-economics-of-honeypots.html?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-economics-of-honeypots


This is marginal revolution read out, and the post for this episode is The economics of honeypots, from Marginal Revolution. The post takes an espionage tactic and treats it as an economic puzzle. A honeypot, in this context, is an attractive operative used to lure a prominent man into a compromising situation. The author begins not with moral judgment but with a standard economic question: what is the equilibrium, and what is the scarce factor? In the case under current consideration, the returns to honeypotting appear very high for somebody. The author lists possible beneficiaries: China, short sellers, or parts of the deep state seeking to shape domestic politics. There is even a suggestion that one of those actors may have driven the timing of a leak. With such high returns, the author asks, why are three potential honeypots not sent every day to the most prominent men? If the target says no, the agency does not have to pay the operative for very long, and the same person can be tried on another man. The option is cheap, and the payoff is large. So the author lays out six hypotheses to explain why the market is not bigger.

The first hypothesis is that the number of attractive women with enough spy training is actually pretty low. The constraint is not beauty or training alone; the agency also has to trust the woman to some degree. That combination of traits is scarce, and it cannot be produced quickly.

The second hypothesis is willingness. The number of attractive women willing to do this work may be small, but the author immediately asks: at what wage? A high enough wage could bring in more recruits. In some countries, threats against family members, or benefits to family members, can be added to the transaction, which changes the supply of willing participants.

The third explanation is access. It is hard to get near the most prominent men, and that limits how many honeypot attempts can even be made. Even if a woman reaches the right social circle, she still has to find time alone with the man, and that is not easy to arrange. The scarce factor here is opportunity.

The fourth hypothesis is the most striking. In fact, three potential honeypots are sent every day to the most prominent men. If that is true, the practice is already common, and the reason we do not see it is that most attempts fail or stay hidden. The constraint would be detection, not supply.

The fifth hypothesis is competition. A honeypot is not competing against no one. As the author puts it, competition from non-honeypot women is so strong that honeypots do not have such a great chance. The non-honeypot temptresses, in the author's words, sometimes have stronger vetting as well, because they come with trust already built into the social environment. The trained operative's edge is smaller than it looks.

The sixth hypothesis is that some prominent men go the Epstein route instead. That means delegated vetting and a kind of mutual hostage-taking, where everyone shares compromising information. But the author notes that this proved extremely risky as well, so it is not a cheap substitute.

Read together, the hypotheses point in different directions. Some say supply is limited; others say demand is already being met; one says the action is invisible. The post does not pick a winner. The closing question is simply what else. It is an invitation to supply more candidates. The economic frame is what holds the piece together: if a tactic has high apparent returns, it must face some hidden cost or constraint. The scarce factor could be trained and trusted women, willingness, access, visibility, ordinary competition, or risk. The exact answer matters for understanding how often honeypots are sent, and the post offers six ways to think about it.

  1. The economics of honeypots