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Source: https://radioopensource.org/a-new-political-order/
A New Political Order, from Radio Open Source in Clips. Christopher Lydon's guest is the historian Gary Gerstle, emeritus Paul Mellon Professor of American History at Cambridge. The episode begins with the midterm results: Abdul El-Sayed of Michigan, the first Muslim in the United States Senate; Keisha Bottoms, the first woman in the Georgia governor's office; Elon Musk's half-billion-dollar effort to buy Congress and Donald Trump's losses. But Lydon wants a broader frame. He asks Gerstle to explain what he calls a political order.
Gerstle says he and the writer Steve Fraser developed the concept to see past two-year, four-year, and six-year election cycles. A political order begins as a movement, and it becomes an order only when the opposition party comes back to power and feels it must accept the movement's core principles. The New Deal is his model. Gerstle describes how Franklin Roosevelt's program structured the whole terrain of American politics, and how Republicans had to accommodate it.
The New Deal movement becomes a political order, structuring the entire terrain on which politics in America has to operate. It operates across elections, across party lines, and dominates American politics really until the early 1970s when the combination of an economic recession and a bad war and civil rights turmoil.
A New Political Order, from 3:42
That New Deal order, Gerstle says, dominated American politics until the early 1970s, when recession, a bad war, and civil rights turmoil broke the coalition apart. When Lydon asks how Democrats lost the working-class support Roosevelt had won, Gerstle names two forces. The first is economic: after World War Two, American corporations had no international competitors, but by the 1970s Japan and Germany were competing fiercely, and the old policies no longer worked. The second is race. The New Deal coalition was built on racial exclusion, and once the Democratic Party finally embraced civil rights, it lost its hold on the white South. Lydon notes that Lyndon Johnson himself said the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act would cost the party the white South, and he was right.
Lydon pushes the start of the next order back before Reagan. He argues that Jimmy Carter was really the first neoliberal, a president from a right-to-work state who had no roots in the Roosevelt tradition. Lydon recalls covering Carter's campaign in Pennsylvania, when mine workers asked for better black lung benefits and Carter refused, eventually saying, they chose to be miners. Gerstle agrees that Carter was a transitional neoliberal, but he says Carter was caught between his own direction and a Democratic Party that still contained Ted Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey, and a strong New Deal remnant.
The neoliberal order had to wait for Bill Clinton. Gerstle says the big question in 1992 was whether Clinton would repudiate Reaganism, and the answer was no. Clinton declared the era of big government over, passed the Telecommunications Act, repealed Glass-Steagall, and became more of a deregulator than Reagan himself. Lydon adds the Noam Chomsky line: neoliberalism is not new and it is not liberal. For a while the free-market promise seemed to work, Gerstle says, but the financial crash of 2008 and 2009 changed that. The recovery was weighted toward people with stock market investments. Whole districts of American life were left out. Those left out, Gerstle argues, became Trump's troops.
When Lydon asks how to explain Trump, Gerstle says Trump has a clear idea of political disorder. He loves to demolish things, he reads the room, and he runs on domination and submission rather than durable political principles. But Gerstle says Trump did have durable commitments on trade and manufacturing. He and Bernie Sanders were both protectionists in the 1990s, utterly marginal, and then both broke from the free-market consensus in 2016. Gerstle describes a Trump speech in Pittsburgh to steelworkers.
If you didn't know. who was giving the speech, you would not be able to tell me whether this was Bernie Sanders. or Donald Trump. Oh, interesting. They had the same message. Now, there were profound differences between the two, but they broke from the magic of the free market. They said government must intervene immediately.
A New Political Order, from 19:43
On Gerstle's telling, Trump and Sanders both blew up the neoliberal order, and Trump won the immediate victory. But Gerstle says Sanders' influence should not be underestimated.
Lydon asks what to call Trumpism now. Gerstle says he calls it a MAGA political order, a populist order on the surface, but at bottom ethno-nationalist. It is coded for the average American as white, hostile to much of the world, and eager to restore a traditional culture against cosmopolitanism and diversity.
Lydon turns back to the founders and asks what political order they thought they were giving the country. Gerstle says they were acutely conscious of the fragility of republics. Their answer was division of power among institutions and between the federal government and the states, and it worked for about two hundred and thirty years. The Trump threat, Gerstle argues, is that the constitutional order may no longer be strong enough to withstand the pounding, especially with a weak Congress and a Supreme Court that has granted the presidency powers it should not have.
Then Lydon points to the new Democratic stars, including James Tallarico, Abdul El-Sayed, and the new governor of Texas, Hinojosa. He asks what their implied political order is. Gerstle calls it left-leaning populism, as opposed to the right-leaning populism of Trump. He takes the story back to the Biden administration, which he says is too quickly being swept into the dustbin of history. Biden, in Gerstle's account, was the first president to break the Democratic Party out of neoliberal orthodoxy in a serious way: the big public works program, the green climate policy, the reshoring of manufacturing. But Biden failed to ignite excitement among Americans. The young winners of 2026 are the children of that failed Biden-Sanders moment, and they have learned lessons about communication, about going into Texas and Georgia, and about not foregrounding the language of diversity.
Lydon offers El-Sayed's victory speech as evidence. He says El-Sayed told his crowds that the attacks on him were attacks on the very idea of America. Gerstle says El-Sayed kept redirecting questions about Gaza and Israel back to the Michigan person without a job or health insurance. He also points to Hinojosa, who refused to use the word progressive on The Daily and kept talking about ordinary Americans against the oligarchs. The election was full of firsts, Gerstle says, but the candidates campaigned for a populist America, not a diverse America. That, he argues, is a learning curve after Trump pinned the woke label on Democrats in 2024.
Lydon asks if these pieces can be stitched into a new political order. Gerstle says the ingredients are there: government back in the economy, good jobs, health care, Medicare for All, progressive taxation, regulation of AI, and attention to climate. He warns that one midterm is only a first step. The Democrats would have to win again in 2028 and again in 2032 before he would call it a new political order. Lydon shifts to the moral register running through the campaign: doctors, pastors, faith talk, a sign reading love thy neighbor. Gerstle says every successful political order must do more than deliver dollars and cents. It must offer a vision of the good life.
It has to be something. that conveys to you that you will have opportunity, that you will have fulfillment, that part of America will in some meaningful way be yours. And that means that at some times politicians need to talk in a... if not a moral register, then a values register. This was true of the New Deal order. This was true of the neoliberal order. It was a promise about a good life that Americans would have access to. And that becomes an animating force in politics itself. And I found interesting what you said.
A New Political Order, from 41:39
That is why, Gerstle says, the emergence of Democratic candidates speaking openly about religious faith could be so significant. If the right's monopoly on faith and politics breaks, it would be an extraordinary development, especially in Texas.
Near the close, Lydon asks how Americans get themselves out of a mess this profound. Gerstle says the election itself showed one route: elections retain their power. But he insists there can be no recovery unless Congress recovers its jealousy of its own powers. He points to the 1970s, after Watergate and Vietnam, when Congress acted to reclaim its authority. That is the precedent he wants the new Congress to emulate. The conversation leaves an open question: can a younger left-leaning populism become a real political order, or will America remain in a volatile stretch between orders?